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Navy-Matters supports the: |
Welcome to Navy Matters The focus of this site is on the future of the Royal Navy and in particular its equipment projects. Please note that all opinions expressed and speculations made are entirely my own, they are in no way supported by the Royal Navy. Nor does this unofficial site have any connection with, or endorsement by, the Royal Navy. I welcome any contributions - articles, photo's, news, corrections or other feedback.
An Unhappy Sixth Anniversary The eighteen of February 2008 was the sixth anniversary of the MOD ordering the hulls of the three Batch 2 Type 45 destroyers. This order was not for complete warships - that took another four and a half years to arrange.
These three destroyers are the last surface ships to have been ordered for the Royal Navy, or the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service, with the minor proviso of the VT owned HMS Clyde - an Offshore Patrol Vessel which is currently leased by the MOD for five years for Falkland Islands duties. The Royal Navy is now in the astonishing situation where since the last warship was ordered sailors have joined the service, been trained, had an active career and have left the service. Readers of this website are probably all too aware of the governments constant repetition of the mantra "We are in the middle of the biggest shipbuilding programme for the Royal Navy in decades" (e.g. Baroness Taylor, Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support, 27 November 2007) - but the difference between the political rhetoric and the reality has now gone far beyond an acceptable stretching of the truth by politicians. Long planned orders have simply not been placed as expected, including:
A more hidden problem - but with disastrous implications for the Royal Navy in the next decade - has been the lack of progress in replacing the remaining Type 22 Batch 3 frigates and the oldest Type 23 frigates. The last serious iteration of the Future Surface Combatant was put on ice three years ago, the Sustained Surface Combatant Capability team came up with some interesting ideas last year but there has been no major developments since. If the frigate HMS Cornwall was really to be replaced in 2014 in accordance with the last announced official plans, an order would be needed now. The depressing reality is a widespread dull acceptance that she and her three sisters (16% of the current frigate/destroyer escort force) won't be replaced, and that the Type 23's will have to run on far longer than they were originally designed for. The one recent bright spot has appeared to be the survival of the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) project. Four year later than once expected, the Defence Secretary Des Browne told the House of Commons on 25 July 2007 "We [sic] can confirm that we will now place orders for two 65,000 tonne aircraft carriers". Unfortunately eight months on that order has still not been placed for reasons that the House of Commons Defence Select Committee has called mysterious. On 29 January 2008 General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue told the Committee "We are not quite ready to sign the contract. There are some commercial issues with the joint venture. The BAE Systems and VT joint venture [which will manufacture much of the carriers] needs to be set up and that is rolling at the moment ... that is the issue". However BAE Systems and VT Group are in turn hinting that the Joint Venture would only be established when the MOD had firmly committed to the construction of the carriers. The result is a "chicken or the egg" type impasse that would be comical if it wasn't so serious for the Royal Navy, the workers affected, and the security of the UK. There is a strong suspicion that the desperately cash strapped MOD is not unhappy about having an excuse to delay the signing of a multi-billion pound prime contract for the manufacture of the carriers. However outright cancellation of the CVF project does seem very unlikely, and the MOD is continuing to place relatively low value contracts (in the millions and tens of millions of pounds) for equipment. Perhaps most interestingly the MoD announced on 4 March 2008 a contract with Corvus worth £65 million for the supply of 80,000 tonnes of steel for the manufacture of the two ships. It's interesting because an oddity is how little real co-operation is occurring in relation to the manufacture of CVF and the new French aircraft carrier PA2 (which is based on the CVF design). The UK-only order for steel has highlighted this as steel was item that had previously been specifically mentioned as likely to be a joint procurement - the two countries are essentially going it alone despite previous rhetoric. France now expects to save just €50 million from industrial arrangements with the UK related to the manufacture of its new carrier, several hundreds of millions were still being suggested a year ago. The big savings would have been achieved by a joint build approach for all three ships, but the British Government (rather than perhaps the MOD) simply had no interest in effectively transferring some work to more efficient French shipyards. Back in July 2007 industry was hoping that steel would be cut on the first carrier (HMS Queen Elizabeth) late this year, that date is now rapidly sliding through next year. The MOD still claims that current in-service dates for the carriers of 2014 and 2016 haven't been affected by the delay in signing the CVF manufacture contracts, but they will be. And even if HMS Queen Elizabeth does actually enter service in 2014, it's hard to see where she will get a useful air group from. T Even worse is the fixed-wing aircraft situation. Due to defence cuts and ill advised changes in organisation the Joint Harrier Force has just half the frontline strength strength that it had four years ago (27 front line aircraft compared to about 50 ) - and this is being rapidly worn out in Afghanistan. One CVF could accommodate the entire Joint Harrier Force with considerable room to spare. Reports from the USA indicate that because of funding problems the MOD wants to defer its purchases of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Harrier replacement under the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) project, and that the UK's first squadron now won't be operational until 2018. Israel is apparently anxious to take over the UK's early deliver slots. Originally the CVF and JCA Projects (and also MASC) had a synchronised entry in to service (2012) and this may again happen but shifted right six years - giving an excuse to slow down the CVF orders and build. The key problem is that the MOD simply doesn't have the funding needed to buy simultaneously the planned 88 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 fighters at £80 million each and the planned "up to 150" F-35B JSF's at £40 million each. If Typhoon Tranche 3 goes go ahead goes ahead then the expectation is that the UK will buy just 80-90 F-35's over an extended period, starting only when Typhoon Tranche 3 costs begin to wind-down. Some of these F-35 will also probably be diverted to meet the RAF's requirement for a "Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability "(DPOC) to replace Tornado deep-strike, Joint Force Harrier seems unlikely to increase its frontline strength beyond the current 27 aircraft when it converts to the F-35 - and recent experience indicates that very few of these will ever will be spared for operation from the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers, which have been designed to operate 36 F-35's.
The F-35C requires a much bigger carrier than the current 20,000 tonnes Invincible-class - but is precisely what the 65,000 tonnes Queen Elizabeth-class will be. Such a change would delay the in-service dates of the carriers by about a year due to design changes and the long lead times needed for some equipment (e.g. catapults), but that is going to happen anyway. The build cost of the carriers will also increase by maybe £150-200 million each (10%?), as will running costs, but increased standardisation and co-operation with the French and American navies will help limit these increases. The above scenario is logical but handicapped by a serious problem - the UK is apparently all but locked in to buying Typhoon Tranche 3 and would face paying its partners huge penalties (£1 billion has been reported) if it doesn't buy them. The UK could have counted the recent Saudi Arabian for 72 Typhoon's against its commitment as this was a government-to-government sale (effectively selling on aircraft with no miles on the clock) , but the Labour government wasn't willing to face the resulting political fallout from annoyed partners arguing that the UK had broken the spirit of previous agreements.
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© 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated. |