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Pre-Downselect - This old page reflects the progress of the programme just prior to the 30 January 2003 decision in favour of BAE Systems. History already!Part 11. BAE Systems Design
2. Thales Naval Design
3. Miscellaneous Illustrations
For the history of the CVF design in artists impressions, including early or unlikely CVF designs, see here. For the deck layouts of the various CVF designs considered, see here. Specification (Provisional)
Table Notes:
The CVF Programme The decision to replace the UK Royal Navy's (RN's) three current Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two much larger Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) vessels was perhaps the single most important outcome of the UK government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Entering service in 2012 and 2015, they are expected to displace about 55,000 tons apiece and each embark up to 48 aircraft, making them among the largest and most powerful warships ever to serve with the RN. CVF represents one of the most demanding product design, production engineering and systems integration challenges ever to be addressed in the UK. With an initial acquisition and support cost projected to be in the region of £2.7 billion ($4.2 billion) at current prices, and a through-life cost estimated at about £6 billion, it is the highest-profile defence capital programme of recent times and, according to Chief of Defence Procurement Sir Robert Walmsley, it is a flagship for the Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) 'Smart Acquisition' initiative.
Programme Origins The current Invincible class of small aircraft carriers are scheduled to leave service between 2010-2015 and preliminary studies in to a possible replacement - initially entitled CVSG(R), later CV(R) and finally CVF - started as early as 1994. During the pre-feasibility work three options were considered:
IOne option was a ship life-extension programme (SLEP) for the existing Invincible's. A study was undertaken by BAe-SEMA in 1995 which concluded that a SLEP was technically risky on account of existing hull fatigue and the problems of inserting an additional hull section to increase capacity. It was found that the hull could be cut safely at one point only, directly in front of the bridge, and inserting a new 80ft hull section would increase aircraft capacity by just four. Even when stretched, the CVS's comparatively narrow beam and constricted hangar layout would continue to pose operational problems and, moreover, and would not provide the dramatic increase in air wing capacity offered by the larger new-build CVF. t was concluded that a "SLEP and Stretch" was disproportionately expensive given the limited capability improvement conferred by the modifications over a relatively short additional lifespan. Another option considered was the conversion of a merchant vessel with a 20 strong airgroup, this was quickly discarded as unsatisfactory on grounds of both cost and operational effectiveness. The final option considered was new build aircraft carriers in a broad range of designs, the studies examining various STOVL, STOBAR, and CTOL configurations with air groups ranging from 15 to 40 aircraft. By the end of 1996 the pre-feasibility work was complete and DOR(Sea) concluded that the most effective solution was a new 30-40,000 ton vessel operating a standard airgroup up to 40 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, plus an additional 10 in surge conditions. Due to the inevitable high costs, this programme became a major consideration during the 1997-8 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process. A special carrier working group was established to critically examine the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) requirement against the backdrop of the changing strategic environment and the UK's likely future foreign and security policy demands. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability to deploy offensive airpower would be central to future force projection operations. However, it also noted that the UK couldn't be certain that there will always be access to suitable airbases. Successive operations in the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo had demonstrated that aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility, as well as offering a coercive presence which contributes to conflict prevention and forestalls the need for war. The current Invincible class aircraft carriers were designed for Cold War antisubmarine warfare operations in the North Atlantic. However, the limited size of their air groups meant that they were now less able to fulfil the increasingly challenging security demands facing the UK around the world. There was thus a clear need for larger vessels, each of which would be capable of carrying and operating a larger and more powerful carrier air group, if the costs could be contained within affordable limits.
The case for CVF was ultimately accepted and the Strategic Defence Review announced that when the Invincible class carrier force reached the end of its service life it would be replaced by two such new large carriers. The formal requirement - ST(S) 7068 - was subsequently approved at the end of 1998. However, despite the SDR decision to build new carriers, as an alternative to the CVF programme the MoD continued to consider the feasibility of extending the service life of two of the three existing Invincible class CVS's by 10 years, i.e. the required in-service date for their replacements would change from 2012 to 2022. An invitation to tender for the further special refit (FSR) study contract was issued in early 1999 and the work was probably completed by year's end. The FSR feasibility study addressed various issues including the costs of a life-extension refit; the operational costs of the converted vessels; adaptation costs to enable the ships to operate JSF-class aircraft; and an appropriate refit programme. Although its conclusions were never published, the FSR study apparently found that the CVS's cannot be cost-effectively altered to operate the Joint Strike Fighter (assuming the STOVL variant is purchased by the UK), partly because they are simply to small for a plane much larger than the Harrier. Adoption of the FSR option is now regarded as very unlikely by both defence and industry officials and the significance of the study has been played down by both. It has been suggested that the MoD aimed to utilise the study simply as a means of pre-empting Treasury pressure to accept the refit option by demonstrating at an early stage that a FSR is not a cost-effective alternative to CVF, and is only capable of producing short-term savings.
CVF Role The Invincible class of carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine warfare operations, with an airgroup of mainly ASW helicopters plus a limited air defence capability provided by a small number of embarked Sea Harriers. This essentially defensive role is no longer appropriate and the emphasis with he Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) is now on increased offensive air power and an ability to operate a wider range of aircraft in a variety of roles. The CVF mission statement has been officially defined:
"The statement of mission need for CVF declares: "The
CVF is to be a joint defence asset with the primary purpose of providing
the UK with an expeditionary offensive air capability that has the
flexibility to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the
widest possible range of roles."
It is expected that CVF will be tasked:
Concurrent with plans for the Future Aircraft Carrier and critical to its success is the "Joint Combat Aircraft" (JCA) programme, formally known as the "Future Carrier Borne Aircraft" (FCBA) programme. The JCA will replace the Harrier GR.9 (the RN's Sea Harrier FA.2 is to be withdrawn from service by 2006) and provide the new carriers with their fighter, strike and reconnaissance capability. Despite the importance of CVF, the high cost of the CVF project has inevitably started to generate criticism. In early and mid-2001 reports started to frequently appear in the press that the project faced cancellation, and it has been blamed as the cause [however improbable] of some of the defence cuts that have been imposed on all three services in recent years - not least the RN which in March 2002 was unexpectedly told that it will losing its Sea Harrier force in 2006, 6 years earlier than anticipated. Unsurprisingly some senior Army and RAF officers see cancellation of the RN's big ticket plan for new carriers as the best solution to the funding shortfall problem, thus avoiding any cuts for their service. Perhaps in response to these reports and rumours, on 22 June 2001 the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, reaffirmed the government's commitment to building two new aircraft carriers and buying JSF at total cost of about £10 billion. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have probably played a key role in saving the CVF project from cancellation. The perceived success of the USN's large carriers in the Afghanistan war of late 2001, and the associated limitations of the much smaller HMS Illustrious in the same action, seems to have greatly reinforced the governments commitment to CVF. On 22 November 2001 the Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Bach said: "The future carriers are very much a lynchpin of our planned defence capability and will greatly enhance our ability to intervene decisively in the world's trouble spots. The value of such large carriers is being underlined on a daily basis by our American allies in operations over Afghanistan. That demonstration of power, reach, and strategic mobility of carrier-borne air power provides ample confirmation that our commitment to this project is the right way to go." In February 2002, the Mr Hoon again stated his own support for the CVF carrier project with what appears to be a key statement that safeguards its future for a year or two: "The [Strategic Defence] Review placed particular emphasis on capabilities relevant to the new circumstances in which we find ourselves – reconnaissance, surveillance, rapid deployment, precision strike, and more effective command and control. That is why the UK has been able to play such a significant role in the military operations in Afghanistan. The acquisition of equipment such as the Apache helicopter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the future carriers will enhance these capabilities still further".
Procurement Process Industry teams led by BAE Systems and Thales Naval Limited are competing
for the prime contractorship of the CVF programme. After completing a
first 12-month phase of assessment studies in mid-2001, the rival
consortia last November each received £25 million 12-month assessment
phase 2 (AP2) contracts. These are due to conclude on 20 November 2002. Progress to Date Formally launched in 1998 the CVF project was soon affected by an approximately 9 months slippage in the JSF Project, and an approximately 21-month delay in the formal JCA down-selection. The CVF Project time-line has been revised to try to absorb this delay over the period until end-2003. The current project plan is as follows:
Under its original procurement strategy, the MoD planned to award parallel competitive Assessment Phase Stage 1 (Analysis of Options) or AP1 contracts to three companies or contractor teams by the end of 1999. It issued invitations to tender in January 1999 to British Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon and Thomson-CSF, however by the closing date of 5 May 1999 it had only received bids from two strong industrial teams: British Aerospace (teamed with its new subsidiary Marconi Electronic Systems) and France's Thomson-CSF (teamed with Raytheon Systems Company and British Marine Technology). The US firms Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, elected not to bid in the face of the major UK companies being tied into a single consortium. In December 1999 the only two bidding industry teams -
led by British
Since the AP1 contracts were awarded, both teams have changed somewhat in both name and composition:
So the two competing contractor teams are now (August 2002): BAE Systems, principle partners:
Thales Naval, principle partners:
The key functional requirements imposed by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the AP1 related to the needs for a sortie-generation profile, battlespace integration, and ship speed sufficient to ensure both rapid deployability and the conduct of air operations. Non-functional requirements included availability, survivability, adaptability, enough stowage space for both ship and aircraft fuel, and adequate stores. The AP1 activities encompassed cost/capability/programme trade-offs; risk analysis; and concept development; and provided information to feed into parallel studies to determine the choice of JCA to be embarked aboard the new carriers. As part of the AP1 studies, both industry teams investigated key enabling technologies and developed six indicatively costed concept ship design studies for large (40 aircraft) and small (30 aircraft) variants of generic short take-off vertical landing (STOVL), short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR), and conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) designs. The work took account of issues like the type and number of aircraft to be carried and the survivability of the ships. Reportedly the BAE team added to its submission a seventh un-solicited study in to a STOVL hybrid design. Although primarily intended to operate the STOVL version of JSF, an angled deck, arrestor gear and a single waist catapult are added to allow the operation of conventional fixed wing aircraft such as the Northrop Grumman E-2C for AEW. The AP1 design studies (eventually totalling some 300 "deliverables") were initially submitted to the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) in May 2000 and their evaluation was completed by June 2001. This was done partly with 3D virtual reality simulation in an exercise known as Project Vitesse, which was one of the most complex fully interactive simulations ever undertaken. The virtual reality testing used the "Envision" simulation package developed by Delmia and the tests were conducted by engineering consultancy, System Engineering & Assessment. The spectators wore stereo eyeglasses and the simulation was given a 3D effect courtesy of a wide screen projection system rendering the simulation in stereo. The simulations involved real-time, interactive, routine operations, such as the actions of hanger and flight deck operators. The manoeuvrability of planes within confined hanger and deck areas was also tested. The aim of the simulation was to highlight potential problems in manning and on-deck aircraft movement and to avoid the sort of costly mistake that occurred when the French navy introduced its new Charles De Gaulle aircraft carrier - carrier's flight deck was found to be too short for Hawkeye E-2C aircraft to land on and putting it right cost around £50m.
Following the announcement in January 2001 that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will fulfill the FCBA (now JCA) role, assessment work for the CVF programme focused on the two JSF variants available; Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) and the Carrier Variant (CV) conventional take off and landing - the STOBAR configuration being dropped. In October 2001 Lockheed Martin won the competition to build JSF with their F-35 aircraft. The output from the CVF Assessment Phase work fed into the parallel JSF/F-35 selection studies and helped inform the decision on the choice of F-35 variant be embarked aboard the new carriers. The STOVL variant was finally selected in September 2002. The decision process weighed the RN's existing STOVL training and experience, and the lower ship construction and running costs of a STOVL carrier, against the significant aircraft weight & performance benefits of CTOL operations, the ability to cross-deck operate with US and French carriers, and a greater possibility of landing-on damaged aircraft. The delay in JCA selection (or rather selection between the F-35 CV and STOVL variants) from the original date of late 2000 left a hole in the Assessment Phase timescales as trying to design in detail a carrier without fixed knowledge of the air element and its mode of operation is impossible. The JCA decision deferment has resulted in changes to the scope and timing of the CVF assessment phases, and completion of the Assessment Phase Stage 1 that was originally scheduled for December 2000 was allowed to slip to June 2001. Trying to make the best of the delay, Ali Baghaei, leader of the CVF integrated project team in the DPA, said: "There will be more focus on a generic approach to the requirement before we look at design options in the period prior to JCA down selection. We are currently assessing proposals from industry on how their programmes would be adjusted to accommodate these changes to the CVF programmes." In the meantime, the rival BAE Systems and Thales teams used the extra time to pursue a twin-track policy:- concentrating on generic carrier designs and looking at areas where commonality can be maximised below the flight deck and hangar deck irrespective of the JCA selection. In spring 2001, BAE Systems and Thales were expected to be awarded to Assessment Phase Stage 2 (AP2) contracts in June or July 2001, but this was delayed amidst reports of hard negotiations between the MOD and the two contractor teams, and an insistence by the contractor teams that the value of the contracts on offer was insufficient for the work and risks involved. It is public knowledge that unfortunately a rather adversarial relationship has developed between MOD and the contractor teams. It's been admitted on all sides that a challenge during AP2 will be to build on relationships established during AP1, and develop a more positive and productive partnership ethos. On 22 November 2001 it was finally announced that the MOD had awarded BAE Systems and Thales Naval Ltd competing 12 month contracts worth around £30 million (actually £25m plus VAT) each for AP2. Revised and shortened compared with original plans, AP2 will now run until 20 November 2002 and the competing consortia will concentrate on refining their design proposals and risk reduction, their work providing the basis for the choice of a preferred prime contractor by the MoD in early 2003. The Assessment Phase Stage 2 (Risk Reduction and Cost Capability Trades) work will be undertaken over six phases and will involve risk reduction and more detailed work to develop parameters for the detailed design, build and support of the preferred carrier option. In the Assessment Phase Stage 1 (Analysis of Options) little emphasis was put on restricting the cost of the proposed designs, during AP2 keeping within budgets and cost constraints will become a very important factor. The MOD will also be seeking to identify Differentiators between the two proposals that will enable the downselect decision, and that can be audited and defended. Initially both STOVL and CTOL designs had to be considered in AP2, a BAE spokesmen stated in early 2002: 'We've agreed with the MoD that we'll do a certain amount of twin tracking. If anything can be generic that's fine but at certain points the variants diverge. We'll take both designs to a level of maturity by the third quarter of this year.'
But in September 2002 the selection of the STOVL variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF was announced and the new carriers will therefore be designed to operate this, the two consortia are thus able to now focus on a single design concept. However given that the new carriers are planned to have a service life of up to fifty years - longer than that expected for the aircraft - BAE Systems and Thales, have also been asked by the MOD to opt for a design which can be adapted to operate more conventional aircraft types if necessary later in the ships' lives. To this end, the ships will have the capability to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear, although they will be initially built with the "ski-ramp" for STOVL operations. A down selection to a single preferred prime contractor will be made about January 2003. The selected prime contractor will be awarded a final Assessment Phase Stage 3 (AP3) contract, probably worth £10 million, in early 2003. AP3 will will focus on further risk reduction, decide between key cost/capability trade-offs, further mature the selected design and build strategy, and refine costings. It should deliver to the MOD in mid-2003 a robust, fully costed proposal for the Demonstration and Manufacture of two vessels. The preferred prime contractor will be required to ensure the maximum degree of competition amongst potential sub-contractors in order to obtain the best proposal price. Currently, final CVF build approval by ministers (Main Gate) is planned for December 2003. A contract award to a winning single prime contractor for the D&M Phase is due to follow in early 2004. In total the MoD will spend about £110 million in total on the Assessment Phase, which is about 7 or 8 per cent of the CVF Project budget. The two contractor consortia are expected to put in some of their own money in order to produce the best and winning bid. The outcome of the FJCA downselection, and associated
debates on 'future proofing', is most keenly awaited by the DPA and the
two potential prime contractors (both of whom have established their
project offices on the outskirts of Bristol within easy reach of the
DPA's Abbey Wood headquarters). As AP2 approaches its conclusion, they
are keen that twin-track should be truncated as quickly as possible so
they can mature their respective designs, refine their business process
models and increase confidence in their costings around a single
solution. CVF OptionsThe contending designs for the CVF requirement originally (1999) consisted of three basic launch variants:
in 2000 a fourth option emerged:
and finally in 2002 a fifth option:
Lacking heavy and bulky catapults and arrestor gear the STOVL configured carrier design was anticipated to be the smallest and cheapest option, and to make best use of existing RN and RAF experience and training with the Harrier. It's also considered that a given number of STOVL aircraft can maintain a slightly higher sortie rate than the same number of STOBAR or CTOL aircraft. However, CTOL also has significant advantages. The purchase of off-the-shelf aircraft such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E-2C Hawkeye 2000 would avoid the risks and cost of developing the JSF STOVL version and a new AEW aircraft - thereby mitigating the greater cost of their carrier platform and their higher "fly-away" unit plane cost. Also, CTOL aircraft can generally launch and land at higher weights than STOVL aircraft, giving them considerable advantages in terms of payload and range. And with CTOL carriers the RN would be able to cross-deck aircraft with the French and US navies. Table 1: Summary of Characteristics of the CVF Options
The choice of CVF configuration was expected to be effectively made in late 2000 when the selection of an aircraft to meet the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement was originally due to be announced. The STOVL configuration of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had long been officially considered a strong favourite for FCBA/FJCA, but the JSF programme was experiencing lengthy delays and the STOVL demonstrators did not fly until early 2001. But despite the delays, in late 2000 the MoD Equipment Acquisition Committee (EAC) recommended procurement of JSF for JCA, expressing as expected a preference for STOVL. Without waiting for the success (or otherwise) of the JSF technology demonstrator trials to become clear, on 17 January 2000 the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the USA committing $2 billion (over £1.3 billion) to the next Engineering and Manufacturing and Development (EMD). This decision was necessary to enable the UK to remain a full partner in the JSF programme. The UK also announced that another £600 million had been allocated to modifying JSF to UK requirements and integrating it with CVF. And on 26 October 2001 it was announced by the American Department of Defence that Lockheed Martin had been chose as prime contractor to develop and build the Joint Strike Fighter, now designated the F-35.
STOVL or CV F-35 Although the UK firmly committed to JSF for meeting its JCA requirement in January 2001, no decision was initially made between the two carrier capable variants. Instead the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) put in to place a mechanism to decide whether the UK should opt for the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, hitherto the UK's planning assumption, or the Carrier Variant JSF (the latter actually designated as the "CV" variant because the land-based JSF variant for the US Air Force is confusingly designated the "CTOL" variant!). One factor for this indecision was the fact that the USA was considering abandoning the technically risky JSF STOVL variant, and concentrating on just the CV and CTOL variants, another was the greater than expected difference in performance between the STOVL and CV variants The MoD's difficulty in coming to a conclusion on FJCA in part reflected the continuing uncertainties about the relative cost and performance of the F-35 STOVL and CV variants, their impact on the carrier design, and their implications for through-life cost of ownership. It also had to take into account the results of operational analysis examining the UK's overall future offensive air capability, and 'softer' issues such as the concept of operations.
"The decision to be made between the STOVL and [CV] variants will be a difficult one," said Wing Cdr Green said RAF Wing Cdr Mark Green of the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) integrated project team (IPT). "They are being viewed as equal competitors. Our final decision will be informed by the results of the current concept demonstration phase, study work to examine the UK's future offensive air capability, and a range of 'softer' issues such as our concept of operations." "It's a very complex decision-making matrix, and the arguments for and against are very tight," said one senior maritime aviator. "It goes without saying that the CV variant gives us access to more target sets, will have a longer range and a greater 'bring back' capability, but it will undoubtedly come at greater cost. I suspect it will ultimately be a balance of investment decision." The generally favourable experience of STOVL carrier operations over the previous 15 years had by the mid-1990s brought the RN close to prescribing a STOVL solution for the then Sea Harrier Replacement (subsequently incarnated as the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft and now JCA). The service was an avowed proponent of STOVL on account of, amongst other things: better sortie-generation rates; reduced aircraft impact on overall platform size and cost; and the ability to operate in higher sea states. Yet in 2001 these assumptions began to be revisited. For one thing, the size of the carrier had been driven up quite significantly to accommodate and operate an air wing sufficient to achieve desired sortie-generation rates. As a result, CVF was likely to displace around 55,000 tons regardless of whether it operated a STOVL or CV air group. At this size, sea state impacts less on aircraft operating limits. Industry sources suggested that CVF should be able to conduct operations in conditions up to Sea State 6. A CV-configured carrier would enable cross-deck interoperability with the USN and the French Navy, and open the way to a more capable MASC solution, nullifying the misalignment between the JSF downselection and the MASC programme. By mid 2002 the Royal Navy increasingly saw the CV version as being cheaper, flying further and carrying more. "The requirement is value for money," said Commander Ron Finlayson, in charge of the Royal Navy's surface ship capabilities. "We plan to run these ships for 50 years and in cooperation with other navies. We wouldn't expect to regularly run U.S. Navy F/A-18s or French Rafales off them, but do we want to be locked into a configuration that only STOVL aircraft can use?". Also, some people started to have challenge the gradient of the additional training penalty incurred for CV vis-a-vis STOVL, arguing that high-fidelity simulators, JSF's advanced flight-control system and modern auto-land facilities make carrier landings far less challenging than hitherto assumed. Assumptions on the cost delta between a STOVL and a CV carrier also proved overly pessimistic. Sources from both contractor teams suggested a differential of between £80 million and £100 million per ship at build, significantly less than £200 million previously speculated. But in mid 2002 it was also reported (e.g. by JDW) that the higher echelons of the RAF - the service that will 'own' the aircraft - were firmly inclined towards STOVL. This is in part because of its flexibility of deployment - frequent mention is made of its ability to disembark on to rough airstrips ashore - and also because of the lower training penalty to keep those predominantly RAF-manned FJCA squadrons carrier current. MoD and industry sources further suggested that the RAF was also anxious that FJCA should not threaten Eurofighter Tranche 3, nor dilute its aspirations for the Future Offensive Air System. UK industry also voiced its support for selecting the STOVL variant of the F-35 for FJCA. Rolls-Royce, as developer and supplier of the STOVL variant's shaft-driven lift fan, stands to gain far greater industrial benefit from a decision in favour of STOVL, which would in turn bring UK political weight to bear on the US Department of Defense's commitment to the USMC STOVL offtake. BAE Systems sources also indicated that, from a programmatic and long-term business outlook, a decision in favour of STOVL would be favoured. The MoD's Investment Approvals Board (IAB) re- convened
on 12 August 2002 to consider the downselection of the STOVL or CV
variant of JSF for FJCA, after being unable to reach a decision in a
previous meeting in early July. Ultimately, the decision was seen by observers as hinging on the wider balance of investment judgments. Returning to catapult-launch and arrested-recovery operations with the JSF CV variant would have cost more, but pound for pound represents the most cost-effective way of getting bombs on target. The chosen STOVL option will deliver a more modest capability somewhat below that of a CV solution, but will cost less overall. That in turn leaves more money available to be spent elsewhere in the MoD's hard-pressed equipment programme. But by selecting an "adaptive" design for CVF, the door has not been completely closed on the possibility of CTOL operations in the future.
CVF Design Important note, in all early statements about CVF the MoD and DPA seem to deliberately avoid stating whether the tonnages it sometimes mentions are light, standard or full load, given the considerable difference between these (20-30% between light and full load for large warships!), this is not a minor omission - a 40,000 tonnes light displacement carrier could easily displace 50,000 tonnes full load. Also, in all designs, the stated tonnage is actually quite low for the probable dimensions when compared to older generations of aircraft carriers that have served in the RN and elsewhere. This is due to a combination of: little or no heavy armour; the lighter weight of many modern systems, components and materials; modern weight saving construction techniques; and a "cost-effective" commercialisation of hull construction standards in accordance with the new Lloyds Naval Ship Rules. Unlike all British carriers prior to the Invincible Class, no significant amount of armour is likely to be included in the design - whether or not some critical spaces such as the Operations Room will receive armour (steel or composite) protection will depend upon the outcome of vulnerability studies.
Initial CVF studies indicated that the smallest practical design for a STOVL carrier able to support a permanent air group of 40 aircraft, and temporarily an extra 10 aircraft, would be about 38,000 tonnes. Early published artist's impressions for the STOVL variant of the new carrier showed a ship of about 274 metres (900 ft) length. However, both the catapult launched (CTOL) and the Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) variants would require a larger conventional carrier design equipped with an angled flight deck and arrested wires for landing. The smallest practical design for a STOBAR or CTOL carrier able to support the required size of airgroup was determined by the DPA to be about 43-46,000 tonnes. BAE Systems stated that a CTOL or STOVL design would have to be about 10,000 tonnes larger than a STOVL design. Both the DPA concepts published in 1999 and the BAE concepts published in 2000 showed CTOL and STOBAR CVF designs significantly larger than the STOVL designs. By this stage the CVF design began to very much reflect the strong influence of Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then First Sea Lord and later Chief of the Defence Staff, who's maxim was "Air is free, and steel is cheap". Certainly a large ship would ensure that (unlike the Invincible's) that there's plenty of room for mid-life update and expansion, and in an emergency the carrier could carry a much larger "surge" airgroup than normal. The large size is to provide the greatest possible deck area which not only facilitates aircraft handling but also allows the incorporation of large magazines and fuel stowage. Magazines will, in fact, have a significant impact upon ship size and costs. The Royal Navy has demonstrated that a large ship is not only cheaper to build in terms of cost per tonne but also has lower maintenance costs. However the larger hull sizes will create some operational and support problems, for example a lack of suitable dry docks, which could be expensive to resolve. The STOBAR CVF design was eliminated in January 2001, at the end of Assessment Phase Stage 1, but the two competing carrier contractors continued to develop alternative an ever larger designs based on operating STOVL or CTOL aircraft. In 2000 BAE Systems stated that it was studying various size CVF designs in range 250-340m long and 30-50,000 tonnes displacement.
Numerous magazine and newspaper reports in 2001 and 2001 suggested that CVF would displace at least 50,000 tonnes (which was also mentioned by the Head of the DPA in May 2001), increasing to perhaps 60,000 tonnes for a CTOL design. French Navy and DGA officials after discussions and exchanges with their UK counterparts in early 2001 suggested that the planned weight for an empty CVF was now slightly over 55,000 tonnes, this would imply a full load displacement of about 70,000 tonnes! While was too going to far, it perhaps indicates some of the extremely large designs under consideration at that point in time. In November 2001 BAE Systems stated that it was now studying CVF designs in the range 250-340m long and 40-60,000 tonnes. In March 2002, Mark Kane, managing director for the BAE Systems bid estimated that their ship is likely to be around 300m long, with a displacement of 58,000 tonnes and a 72m-wide angled flight deck. If STOVL the ship might be slightly smaller, but Kane points out the advantage of a larger model is that it would give more flexibility, allowing future aircraft of different types to operate from the carrier. In February 2002, Jonathan Rich, the CVF Programme Requirements Manager told a Naval Air Warfare conference that studies by Thales and BAE suggested that to deliver the desired fighting strength, CVF displacement needed to be between 52,000 and 58,000 tonnes when fully loaded with fuel and munitions. At the end of their intended 30-to-50-year lives, during which they would inevitably gain weight, the displacement would be up to 64,000 tonnes. With lengths of 262 to 292 metres (860 to 958 feet), the ships will be not much shorter than the 333-metre USN Nimitz Class carriers, and may be wider than the U.S. ships.
The BAE CTOL CV design dating to about May 2002 was 50,000 tonnes light, 64,000 tonnes full load, and just over over 300m long. The anticipated airgroup was 24 or 36 F-35's (CV variant), 4 E-2 Hawkeye’s, and 6 Merlin HM.1 Aviation facilities include 2 steam cats with steam generators and 2 large deck edge elevators. The alternative STOVL variant was 46,000 tonnes light and 58,000 tonnes full load. No armament is carried except for ILMS/CIWS mounts of a still undetermined model (Phalanx, Sea RAM, ...) plus a few manually operated light calibre guns. Interestingly, in order to further maximise the available deck space, the island of the BAE CVF designs has constantly been been significantly revised. The early concepts had a large long island, perhaps a typical characteristic of British aircraft carriers! However by 2001 it had been made much smaller and very stealthy, although with a very prominent and almost observatory style bridge and FLYCO. Indeed it was probably as small and as compact as practical, barely large enough for the four concealed funnels optimised for low IR signature. Space was allowed for fitting a Sampson multifunction radar, if budget permits, as well as for surveillance this could provide PAAMS fire control functions for Aster missiles fired by accompanying Type 45 destroyers. The long range S1850 search radar has now moved to a separate main mast further aft. The latest designs show what's either once again a single island broken by an athwartship tunnel, (aka CVA-01 back in the 1960's), or perhaps the construction is more like two small islands connected by a flying bridge over a lift. Thales announced in April 2002 that their CVF design was 290 metres long, would displace about 50,000 tonnes (presumably full load), emphasizing the importance of the ship/air interface the design unusually gone has two "islands" for masts, bridge and control towers, instead of the traditional single structure. The twin island design provides greatly enhanced operational survivability by allowing the physical separation of key ship (bridge - forward) and flying control (flyco - aft) functions in separate islands, while offering command and control redundancy for the ship as whole. Additionally, air flow studies show that this island configuration improves the 'air wake' (wind-over-deck) environment for approaching aircraft. The concept also separates some of the ships principal sensors, reducing interference affects and eliminating some trunking within the ship for cooling intakes and exhaust flows. Like BAE Systems. Thales been seeking to maximise flight deck area. They are achieving this with exceptionally large side sponsons which provide a very wide flight deck - over 70 metres (230 ft). Large sponsons relative to the hull size can cause ship stability and motion problems which restrict air operations in high sea states, thus to help reduce excessive ship roll motion damping devices such as large fin stabilisers and the SATRAP moving weight system fitted to Charles de Gaulle are likely to be used. The Thales design has two large deck lifts - one between the two large islands and one aft of the flyco position. The large hanger deck is high enough to ensure that any aircraft likely to be embarked can be maintained anywhere, eliminating the need to move airframes around during maintenance (e.g. as had to be done on board the old HMS Ark Royal IV) Clearly there had been considerable growth in size of the CVF compared with original estimates, and in mid 2002 the press reported that the RN was under some pressure by the MOD to keep the size down to 45,000 tonnes to make basing at Portsmouth easier, and avoid the need for expensive dredging and a standby berth at Southampton. It would seem that this pressure (Treasury driven?) has been resisted.
Although the hybrid design was not formally being considered, its advantages were noted by the CVF IPT team, and it became apparent that the CTOL designs being proposed could be adapted to operate STOVL aircraft with minimum change (a fact that Thales were already emphasising by their use of a common hull) and could be modified if necessary with catapults and arrestor gear to operate a future generation of assisted launch and recovery aircraft. It emerged during early 2002 that officials in the MoD's equipment capability community were seriously contemplating a 'smart' carrier approach. This would ensure that the ship design was sufficiently flexible to adapt to new aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and/or unmanned combat air vehicles entering service during the course of its 50 year service life. Thus in early 2002 both BAE and Thales began edging towards flexible CTOL and STOVL designs with very similar characteristics - reflecting the MOD's increasing preference that the selected design could be converted from one to the other during build or a later refit - e.g. a STOVL design could be adopted that has an angled flight deck configuration and space and weight allowance to add arrestor wire engines and catapults at a later time. Indeed Thales had been always stressed the commonality of their CTOL designs and STOVL hulls, and BAE also began emphasising that their larger CTOL design could easily be adapted to a STOVL configuration and ordered as such, but the MOD would then have the option to convert it over to CTOL if the requirement appeared. At the time of the JCA selection decision in favour of the STOVL variant in September 2002, it was simultaneously announced that the two rival CVF teams had been asked to take forward decided to take forward not the STOVL CVF design, but rather an adaptable CTOL design, modified to operate STOVL in the short to medium term, but with the flexibility to operate other types of aircraft (including UAV's) that require assisted launch and arrested landing after the F35 has left service. The adaptable CVF design will include provisions for the retrofit of catapults and arrestor gear at a later date. The ski-jump will be of something of a bolt on nature" (probably using a split design similar to the Invincible Class, rather than integrated in to the bow hull structure like Admiral Kuznetov). There will be voids where the cats and arrestor gear would be fitted, and although marked out for STOVL operations the flight deck form will effectively incorporate an angled deck - which could be easily modified in to a landing lane for arrested aircraft landings. While the decision would be some increase in ship acquisition costs compared with selecting a purely STOVL CVF design, it will safeguard the investment in the two platforms (CVF and JCA). It will also leave the UK well-placed to adjust its programme in light of any changes to the USN's and USMC's JSF acquisition plans. The selected approach terminates the previous twin-track procurement strategy, whereby the CVF IPT has asked BAE Systems and Thales to develop CVF designs specially optimised for STOVL and CV air groups. In effect, the decision to adopt a 'future proofed' design has de-coupled the carrier platform from the choice of JCA, resolving an obvious paradox: that a carrier optimised purely for fixed-wing STOVL and rotary-wing operations would clearly lack the flexibility "to be able to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest range of roles". After the announcement Thales claimed that its design from the outset incorporated the flexibility to operate a mix of Short Take off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft along with helicopters and potentially Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In order to utilise the full operational potential of the CVF/STOVL JSF weapons system capability, Thales has now adopted a novel extended centre line runway option, that will be used on occasions when it is necessary for JSF to carry increased payloads. BAE has also made changes to its CTOL design, which it now terms an "Adaptable Carrier" variant.
By early 2002 both consortia agreed that the best solution is a mono-hull configuration and both are offering designs whose flight deck will be slightly shorter than that of the US Navy's Nimitz class (332m) but longer than that of the French Charles de Gaulle (261m). Beyond this, however, the competitors' hull forms and approaches to construction are very different. Thales has opted for the traditional format of a V-shaped hull extended with box-shaped sponsors to provide extra hangar and flight- deck space, while BAE Systems prefers a flared hull to provide extra internal space and to reduce the ship's radar cross section. Surprisingly for ships of this size and importance, in order to keep costs down the MOD did not originally require that the CVF design have "flagship" facilities, presumably it was anticipated that these will be provided by an accompanying Type 45 destroyers or Albion Class LPD's. However this requirement has now re-emerged given the obvious suitability of CVF in terms of space and accommodation for a flag role during large deployments, particularly compared with a Type 45 destroyer. Crew SizeManning levels, regarded as key discriminator between the Thales and BAE designs, have been the subject of extensive human-factors analysis. The two contractors are being encouraged to aim for a crew of about 600, similar to the order of today's Invincible-class ships. Additionally, they must also develop appropriate schemes of complement and identify training requirements, taking into account the RN's new TOPMAST manning structure. It is hoped that the normal peace time "lean-manned" CVF crew complement (including airgroup) will be similar to the 1,200 of an Invincible-class ship, this will presumably increase if a maximum size airgroup is carried, or a command staff (normally Commander UK Naval Force (COMUKNAVFOR), or a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) Afloat is embarked. In 2000 BAE Systems stated that its various size CVF designs would require a crew of 1100 to 1400. In November 2001 it also made the slightly confusing statement that the various CVF designs it was examining would have "600 to 1100 crew with embarked squadron and Command Staffs". In October 2002 BAE said that their CVF design would have 600 crew, with embarked squadron and Command staffs up to 1400 personnel. It's intended that crew accommodation on CVF will be at least to the high standard recently developed for the new Type 45 destroyers. Instead of "traditional" large mess decks it's intended that Junior Rates will have 6 berth cabins, Senior Rates will have 4 or 2 berth cabins, while Officers will have shared or individual cabins. [This will all be a revelation to anyone who experienced the inadequate and over-crowded accommodation of RN carriers in the 1960's and '70's.] Its expected that about 10% of the ships crew will be female and the accommodation and "hotel" facilities will be designed with this taken in to consideration.
A key user requirements are substantially higher availability to the fleet and great flexibility in ship employment - the CVF must be equally effectively in combat missions or delivering humanitarian aid.. Achieving this flexibility, and with a smaller crew, implies that more automation will be needed in operating the ship's systems. This poses all sorts of challenges, for example if a trivial mechanical failure (e.g. to a fresh water distillation plant) could potentially stop the ship fulfilling its task due to lack of any on-board expertise to make a repair, then that's unacceptable. The designed service life for the CVF's was originally to be 30 years (the same as the Invincible Class), but the IPT's target is now 50 years.
Airgroup A driving force behind the whole CVF programme is the desire to get a much larger airgroup to sea than the current Invincible Class carriers can embark. It's a fundamental requirement that the adopted CVF design will be able to accommodate a permanent airgroup of up to 40 aircraft, and be able to temporarily accept an additional 10 support aircraft for a total of up to 50 in "surge" conditions. The CVF was also originally required to be able to sustain up to 150 sorties every 24-hour period, a cycle of about 12 sorties every two hours, but the figure has since been reduced to 130 per 24 hours. Intrinsically linked to CVF is the new Future Joint
Combat Aircraft (JCA). After examining various candidate aircraft, the
UK government confirmed in early 2001 that the US Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) programme best met its JCA requirement. As the only Level 1 full
collaborative programme partner, the UK is contributing £1.3 billion to
the JSF system development and demonstration phase. It is spending a
further £600 million to address UK-specific requirements.
Few expect the respective CV and STOVL numbers to hold firm as debates continue within the USN and USMC over the future balance of navy and marine aviation. While the USMC for the past decade has advocated a transition to an all-STOVL strike-fighter force, some senior USN aviators foresee the Marine Corps flying both CV and STOVL F-35 variants, a suggestion not discounted by senior USMC officers at the Farnborough 2002 airshow. This could see the USMC's STOVL buy pegged back to fewer than 300 aircraft. However, AM Sir Jock Stirrup, UK Deputy Chief of the Defence | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
When
plans for the new carriers were formally announced in 1998 their
displacement was estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 tonne and it was
stated that the maximum CVF length being considered was 300 metres (984
feet). But the displacement, and to a lesser extent the
size, of CVF has been creeping up steadily since 1998.
BAE
identified in their assessment work that a key metric to the ships
sortie rate (150 a day being the minimum requirement) is deck size, they
found that a large clear flight deck reduces the constant reshuffling of
aircraft and allows ancillary operations like AEW and ASW helo's to
continue in their own deck areas without getting in the way of the JSF
fighters. This has driven up the size (although not necessarily
the displacement or cost in direct proportion) of the BAE CVF designs -
they have considered designs as long as 340 metres! Perhaps
unsurprisingly, BAE believe that they can comfortably exceed the 130
sorties/day requirement. 
In
2000, BAE Systems spent private-venture funds during AP1 to develop a
'hybrid' CVF design. Its concept envisaged a carrier configured with a
waist catapult and arrestor gear for launch and recovery of CV-type
aircraft, together with a ski-jump forward and a large recovery area for
STOVL operations. Although not publicised, it is understood that Thales
also briefed the MoD on a hybrid design concept. While some in the
MoD's equipment capability customer community welcomed the initiative,
the DPA was markedly less enthusiastic about possible hybrid solutions.
"The hybrid was not optimised for either STOVL or CV," said
one industry source, "so we were told that we were answering a
question that wasn't on the exam paper." 
According
to MOD announcements in September 2002, basic CVF details will include a
length of about 290m long (951 ft), a maximum beam of about 246 feet, a
maximum draft of more than 31 feet, and displace between 55,000-60,000
tonnes (presumably full load). They will be able to accommodate up
to 48 JCA, AgustaWestland Merlin ASW helicopters and maritime airborne
surveillance and control aircraft.
There
will also be considerable excess accommodation for an embarked military
form of up to 1000., although perhaps to a more austere standard.
This could be used for embarked military detachments (e.g. a full
Commando of Royal Marines - complete with supporting weapons and
equipment), sea training classes (e.g. RNR, BRNC midshipmen, etc.), and
for humanitarian purposes (e.g. accommodating evacuees and
refugees). A small hospital with comprehensive medical facilities
will be fitted.