Note:
The following article first appeared in the January
2006 edition of the monthly newsletter Naval Forum UK, published by
AMI
International, which I edit.
Done the
Strategy, now the hard bit
Written: 20 December 2005.
Added to this site: 26 February 2006
Mid-December saw a wave of announcements by the British government that
will have a major impact in the future of the UK’s naval shipbuilding industry.
Perhaps the most important of these was the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS).
|
Lord Drayson, Minister for Defence Procurement (MOD) |
Published on the 15th of December 2005, the DIS offers a strategic view of
future Ministry of Defence (MOD) defence capability requirements (including new
projects) and the industrial capabilities that it wishes to see retained in the
UK for defence reasons.
Lord Drayson was only appointed as the Minister of Defence Procurement last
May, but managed to deliver on his promise to publish a strategy by the end of
2005 - although some work had been done long before that. The DIS is also rather
more useful and relevant than some other recent and pointlessly verbose MOD
policy and strategy documents, but Lord Drayson now faces the difficult
challenge of actually implementing the strategy.
History shows that few defence related strategies are ever fully followed
through by UK governments; they tend to “fade away” in the middle age rather
last until the end of their originally intended time horizon (10 years in the
case of DIS). But it does seem very likely that the DIS will have a considerable
impact in the UK shipbuilding industry between now and the next general
election, likely in 2009.
The DIS is less than complementary about the current situation in the
industry – “The UK maritime business is characterised by high and increasing
overheads, and has a skills base spread across too many entities. Procurement
strategies and commercial arrangements have not adequately incentivised or
enabled rationalisation and efficiency improvements. The sector has failed
consistently to deliver satisfactory performance, with several high-profile
maritime projects encountering delays and cost increases. … The current
situation is unsustainable and places huge pressure on the future programme.”
The DIS defines the following core or key naval industrial capabilities and
objectives for the UK:
- To retain the suite of capabilities required to design complex ships and
submarines, from concept to point of build; and the complementary skills to
manage the build (at least for first of class), integration, assurance, test,
acceptance, support and upgrade of maritime platforms through-life;
- For the foreseeable future, retain all of those capabilities unique to
submarines and their Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, to enable their design,
development, build, support, operation and decommissioning. MOD and industry
must demonstrate an ability to drive down and control the costs of nuclear
submarine programmes;
- Retain on shore (i.e. in the UK) a number of specific key maritime system
capabilities and technologies, including the ability to develop and integrate
into platforms complex maritime combat systems.
- Retain the ability to maintain and support the RN.
|
Increased emphasis is placed on the support and enhancement of existing
warships (FSL)
|
The DIS also identifies a number of immediate actions:
- The MOD will
negotiate with the key submarine companies to achieve a programme-level
partnering agreement with a single industrial entity for the full life cycle of
the submarine flotilla, addressing key affordability issues. The aim is to
achieve this agreement for award of the fourth and subsequent Astute Class
submarines (expected late 2006).
- For Surface Ship Design & Build, the MOD aims
by May 2006 to have reached a common understanding with industry on the core
load required to sustain high-end design, systems engineering and combat systems
integration skills.
- For surface ship support, the MOD will negotiate with the
industry with the aim of exploring alternative contracting arrangements and the
way ahead for the next upkeep periods, which start in the autumn of 2006.
- Key
Maritime Equipment industrial capabilities will be supported by the production
of a sustainability strategy by June 2006.
Key companies mentioned in the
submarine sector are Babcock Naval Services Ltd, BAE Systems, KBR (including DML)
and Rolls-Royce Marine, while key companies in the complex surface warships and
Royal Fleet Auxiliary sector are Babcock Engineering Services Ltd, BAE Systems,
KBR (including DML), Thales, and VT. Swan Hunter is not mentioned, despite being
the lead yard for the Bay Class auxiliary landing ships.
A major issue
highlighted in the strategy is the long-term industrial capacity required by the
MOD. The current shortfall in work is not mentioned, but the DIS claims that it
is expected that the Future Aircraft Carrier, Type 45 Destroyer, Astute and MARS
projects will keep the UK shipbuilding industry fully employed for the next ten
year years. However it is stated that from around 2016 the MOD’s “steady-state”
demand will be significantly lower, and “as a customer, we cannot afford and do
not need to maintain the current pace of successive new platforms once the new
ships are in service”.
|
Indicative procurement spending by the MOD in the naval sector over the next
ten years. Figures from 08/09 are only illustrative. (MOD)
|
|
Project or
Requirement |
DIS
quotation |
|
CVF |
Low
complexity elements of CVF build are strong candidates for offshore
provision, if UK steady-state capacity is exceeded and better value for
money is offered elsewhere. |
|
Type 45 |
Up to eight
Type 45 Destroyers are planned to enter service in the next decade. |
|
Astute |
Three Astute
Class nuclear powered submarines are on contract with BAE Systems and due
in-service in 2009, 2010 and 2012, with potential for a further 5, subject
to affordability. |
|
MARS |
The Military
Afloat Reach and Sustainability programme is a significant planned
investment in a new integrated approach …combined with investment in life
extensions for retained platforms. The MARS system-of-systems may include
Fleet Tankers, Joint Sea Based Logistics and Fleet Solid Support vessels. |
|
Type 23 |
Type 23
Frigate Capability Upgrade Programme is
complementary to the FSC concept and potentially extends the life of the
Type 23 Frigate. Capability upgrades are planned for the combat system, with
updates to address structural strength and platform systems to follow. |
|
Future
Surface Combatant |
A Future
Surface Combatant (FSC) study is looking at how the capability currently
provided by the Type 22 and Type 23 frigates might be met in the future. No
decisions have been taken, but our current assumption for planning purposes
is a two class platform solution.
|
|
Sustained
Maritime Surface Combatant Capability |
The
long-term sustainment of the capabilities currently delivered by Maritime
Surface Combatants alongside a solution for the Key User Requirements
previously identified by the Future Surface Combatant programme.
[Designated
as Pathfinder Programme by DIS) |
|
Vanguard
SSBN Replacement |
The
submarine design programme will ensure options for a successor to the
current Vanguard class deterrent are kept open in advance of eventual
decisions, likely to be necessary in this Parliament. |
|
Amphibious
Warfare |
The future
Amphibious Capability will be built around specialist shipping consisting of
two Landing Platform Docks (LPD), one Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), an
Invincible Class aircraft carrier in the LPH role, and four Landing Ship
Dock(Auxiliary) (LSD(A)). The LSD(A) class is expected to remain in-service
for around 25 years. Additionally, CVF will be deployable in a secondary
role as a Helicopter Carrier. |
|
Mine Warfare |
The Future
Mine Counter-Measures Capability is … being examined. |
|
Minor War
Vessels |
Capability
investigations are underway, exploring the utility of Minor War Vessels for
Maritime Interdiction Operations and an Anti-Fast Inshore Attack Craft
capability. |
|
Support |
In recent
years the total amount of support work has diminished as a result of force
level rationalisation, but the planned life extension of Surface Combatants
moderates the reduction out to 2030. |
|
Future
orders |
For
submarines we have endorsed, but not yet committed funding for a 24 month
SSN build drumbeat….. after the third Astute Class submarine (HMS Artful);
… The longer term surface ship production drumbeat is of the order of one
new platform every one to two years, given anticipated force levels and
platform life cycles. |
|
Design
Capability |
CVF detailed
design work will employ much of the nation’s maritime engineering workforce
to the end of the decade. However, early concept and architectural design
requires a subset of this skilled workforce, which will need [to be] managed
short term sustainment as their employment by CVF diminishes. …Submarine
design capability is at risk if long gaps emerge between first-of-class
design efforts. … We now aspire to an eight year drumbeat … |
In the past the MOD has specified that all warship hulls should be built in
the UK, but this will no longer be the case - “In a change to the previously
stated Defence Industrial Policy, there is no absolute sovereign requirement to
construct all our warship hulls onshore. …. We need to build onshore to the
extent that it sustains the ability to design and physically integrate complex
warships. Furthermore, since warships are rarely prototyped, we need to ensure
that we retain the ability to learn and adjust designs whilst the first of class
is being built”. The DIS says that provided that key capabilities are being
maintained, in future the need for work to be done in the UK will be judged on a
case by case basis. This change in strategy clears the ground for the hulls of
some or all of the MARS tankers to be ordered from foreign commercials
shipyards, and even allows some blocks for the new carriers to ordered from
overseas.
The DIS assesses the current UK shipbuilding industry to be
fragmented, and wants it to consolidate and refocus around a Core Work Load
which will be promised by the MOD, and which will be sufficient to sustain the
key capabilities and represent a viable business. The DIS also considers that
system engineering capabilities are currently being duplicated and sub-optimised
across several companies, and that potential synergies with support business are
not being realized - “There is a clear need to streamline the businesses, making
them more efficient and profitable, removing duplication and establishing clear
centres of excellence”. The DIS emphasise that the MOD will not pay a premium
for utilising any UK capacity in excess of that required to deliver the Core
Work Load.
(MOD) |
UK shipbuilding industry is expected to now begin restructuring
and streamlining itself in order to improve its performance - building upon the
industrial alliance arrangements being put together for the CVF programme. The
MOD will work with industry to address the fundamental issues of affordability
and productivity. The DIS also asks ‘industry’ to maximise the relationship
between in-service support and upgrade, and size itself based upon mirroring
MOD’s future needs and a realistic assessment of military export potential -
“The future for UK shipbuilders lies in high value design, systems and
sub-system assembly and integration; plus specialist and novel hull construction
capability, particularly where there is a high outfit to steel ratio, as
exhibited in complex warships.”
The DIS implies that in future the use of
competition by the MOD will be less common for major and complex naval projects,
“for example, one fully loaded allocated stream of surface ship build might
offer better value for money than several partially loaded streams in
competition”.
|
Weapon System |
DIS
Quotation |
|
Harpoon missile |
It will require an upgrade to give increased capability against a wider
irregular target set. The assumed Out-of-service-date (OSD) is well into the
2020s. |
|
Sting Ray torpedo |
Stingray is currently undergoing an upgrade; Sting Ray Mod 1 which is
expected to enter service next year. Its OSD is assumed to be until the end
of the third decade. |
|
Spearfish heavyweight torpedo |
A replacement (Submarine Launched Underwater Weapon, SLUW) to this
capability is being planned, including Insensitive Munition (IM) compliance,
either based on Spearfish or another military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) weapon,
and is assumed to enter service early in the next decade. |
|
Sea Dart missile
|
Will progressively be replaced by Principal Anti Air Missile System (PAAMS),
firing Aster 30 and Aster 15 missiles, as the RN’s T45 Destroyers enter
service towards the end of the decade. |
|
Seawolf missile |
The Block 2 follow-on missile run has recently entered service and is
envisaged to be in service until the end of the third decade. |
|
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile |
Provides a land attack capability against high value, non-hardened
facilities in heavily defended areas. The new Block IV missiles will bring
additional capability over the current Block III standard missile. They will
be carried by our attack submarine fleet and are expected to enter service
in 2007 with an approximate OSD of at least 2040. |
The MOD’s largest single supplier, BAE
Systems, has welcomed the DIS, and said that it shares the view that there will
be benefit from consolidation in the maritime sector based the substantial
forward core work load on complex surface ships, submarines and their support.
“The company recognises the challenge to deliver affordable platforms and
support – especially on submarines.”
