Editorial

RN Year in Review - 2002
6 February 2003

Sadly 2002 did not prove to be a quite good year for the Royal Navy.  Firstly, the now continuous problems of under-funding and under-manning continued.  Secondly, the RN was faced with a series of defence cuts that represented brutal blows to its capabilities.  Thirdly, progress in news construction was desperately slow  And fourthly, it became very "accident prone"

On the first point I will only remark that on 31 March 2002 the Royal Navy and Royal Marines had a shortfall of some 1,690 trained personnel against the requirement of 39,180 (a deficit of 4.3%). This was a sharp worsening compared with 2001 (when the shortfall was 1360) despite the early pay-off of ships ships and other punitive measures during the year reducing the trained strength requirement by nearly 700 (2%).  In 2001/2 some 5,745 personnel left the RN/RM, but only 5,020 joined, so overall strength continued it's decades long downward trend, to just 42,350. Manpower shortages were admitted by the MOD to be "most critical" for Sea Harrier and Lynx pilots, submarine warfare officers and ratings, and Royal Marines other ranks.

On the funding side, 2002 was a desperate time for the RN.  The government made much political capital in June 2002 of the announcement of what it claimed would be a small increase in the defence budget - although it was more reluctant to comment on suggestions that this merely meant that by 2004/5 the Defence Budget would be almost back to the level in real terms that the government found it when it took office in 1997, or official Treasury figures which showed that there would infact be a 1% cut in the defence budget in real terms between 2001/02 (£30.7 bn in 2005/06 numbers) and 2005/06 (£30.4 bn).  Regardless of any possible future crumbs, during 2002 the armed forces suffered continual "salami slice" defence cuts, and the Royal Navy took a disproportionate amount of those.  The biggest of all was the announcement that the Sea Harrier would be removed from service by 2006, an unexpected calamity of near 1966 scale (CVA-01) that shocked the RN  and lead to the bitter but ignored protests from even the most senior officers (including the Chief of the Defence Staff) as the dire implications became clear.  The bottom line is that for the first time since WW1, the Royal Navy will soon no longer have carrier based fighters providing the fleet with an outer layer air defence capability.  Government assurances that such a capability was no longer needed, or in the very unlikely event that if it was we could expect our allies to provide it (i.e. the Americans and French), fell on very stony ground from both people that remembered the Falklands War in 1982, and our allies who hadn't been consulted first before being committed to providing the Royal Navy with fighter cover!  It can only be hoped that the subsequent operational deployment of RN carriers without any Sea Harrier's embarked was taken after careful military analysis, rather than for on political convenience.

Given the Sea Harrier decision, it was no surprise to observers when it was announced in September that that the STOVL F-35B Joint Strike Fighter had been selected as the UK's Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) in preference to the more capable conventional F-35C, which many in the RN and MOD favoured.  The RAF felt that the F-35C, with its longer range, better avionics and heavier payload represented a serious threat (i.e. cheaper alternative) to its expensive Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) programme for a Tornado GR.4 replacement.  The more limited capabilities of the F-35B avoid such a problem. 

As a sop to the RN, the new future aircraft carriers (CVF) will still (at the cost of an extra £150million!) be built to a conventional (CTOL) design, although modified to a STOVL configuration with a ski-jump (similar to HMS Hermes in the 1970's) they could still theoretically be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear.  The MOD reason for this rather strange decision is is that the replacement for the JCA (in the 2040's!)  may require "cats and traps", which is rather like deciding in the 1940's to build the Swiftsure Class cruisers to a larger and more expensive design because it might be necessary in the 1980's to fit them with missiles instead of guns.

Other cuts during the included the withdraw of the last Type 22 Batch 2 frigate, HMS Sheffield, from service at the end of 2002, more than a decade earlier than was being promised at the start of 2002.  This cut took the RN's escort strength - no mater how measured - to below the 32 mandated by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR).  The operational situation (and the RN's budgetary problems!) were not been helped when in July the newly refitted Type 42 destroyer HMS Nottingham smashed herself on to a submerged - but well charted - rock formation near Lord Howe Island (Australia) - she is not expected to re-enter service until 2005 after recovery and repair costs totalling about £60 million, plus the value of her magazine of written-off Sea Dart missiles.

Another very disappointing cut was the decision in March to immediately withdraw the old LPD HMS Fearless from service rather than run her on as previously planned until the end of the year.  The net saving was about £1.5 million, but the indirect cost was considerable embarrassment for the Royal Navy and a severe capability shortfall in a key area.  With the pay-off of HMS Fearless it has been necessary to beg from the Dutch the use of their LPD Rotterdam for exercises, and operational deployments in connection with Iraq and the "War on Terrorism" have suffered badly.

2002 was also a bad year for BAE Marine Systems, and thus the RN's construction programme as well.  The much troubled Wave Class oilers had still not entered service with the RFA by the end of 2002, delays continued with the Albion Class LPD's (HMS Albion is now not expected to enter service until mid-2003), and the three cornered arguments between BAE, Vosper Thornycroft and the MOD have badly hampered the important Type 45 programme.  But worst of all is the on-going delays and "engineering and design problems" being suffered by the Astute programme.  It now seems likely that HMS Astute will not enter service until 2008, 3 years late, also the programme is already about £800m over budget, red ink that the MOD is refusing to underwrite.  With rundown of the existing S&T SSN force based on schedules still drawn up back in 1997/8, it seems that the RN's SSN force will inevitably drop below the 10 mandated by SDR.  An expected order in 2002 for 3 more Astute's was delayed indefinitely by the MOD, and will not be forthcoming until BAE Systems is seen to have resolved all the problems associated with the programme.

Finally delays continue to be experienced with the Bay Class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary), in particular those being built by BAE's Govan shipyard. BAE Sea Systems is blaming the lead yard, Swan Hunter for the delays.  Although the later has to carry  the blame for getting design information to BAE later than promised, the suspicion is that many of the problems are BAE's own.

But ending on some good news:- as 2002 ended the first of the new and mainly German built Point Class strategic sea lift RoRo transports had already entered service - exactly on schedule - and was already performing an invaluable job.  Also the first of the new Vosper Thornycroft build River Class OPVs - HMS Tyne - has been commissioned. 

Richard

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