It has been three months since my last editorial and it's been not a good three months for the Royal Navy.

While I would very much prefer to, it’s impossible to totally ignore the Iranian incident in March/April 2007 given the harm and damage that it did - the Royal Navy becoming the butt of jokes around the world. 

For right or wrong (and that is still to be determined), there is widespread perception that:

• the seven Royal Marines and eight sailors from HMS Cornwall should not have surrendered on 23 March, while in international waters, without some an attempt at self defence
• they should have had better warning of the approach of the Republican Guard craft, and backup support
• some of the captured personnel appeared almost eager in their co-operation with the Iranians
• the UK’s diplomatic response to a deliberate act of war was weak knee'd
• the fiasco was a diplomatic triumph for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – who "pardoned" and freed the sailors as a "gift to Britain"
• the expected stories of extreme psychological pressure, drugs, even violence against the naval personal actually amounted to no more than some school boy type taunts
• the MOD made a fumble of the highest order when it allowed the released sailors to sell their stories to the press

When the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, feels obliged to write to all naval personal stating: “There is no denying the fact that the reputation of our service has been badly tarnished by the events of the last few weeks … continue all your good work across the board so that we can as quickly as possible restore the enduring RN reputation", clearly there is a serious problem.  It can only be hoped that the outcome of the enquiry led by Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fulton RM (Rtd) will be constructive criticism, and that any issues or shortfalls in errors in training, “de-escalatory” rules of engagement, instructions in the event of capture, equipment, command authority, etc will be swiftly corrected.

It can also be but hoped that the Iranian incident did not contribute to the failure to progress the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) project through the key Main Gate 2 milestone (which would have allowed the two ships to finally be ordered) - this was widely leaked as likely to occur in late March, but did not.  After a long hiatus with no official information, on 17 May 2007 the MOD responded to press speculation about the project by saying "The MOD remains committed to the joint carrier programme and continues to push hard for progress, but we're not there yet."  The statement is almost unbelievable in the context of a project that was originally scheduled to pass Main Gate in October 2003, and seemed on track to achieve this until May/June 2003.

In recent years the CVF project seems to have been caught in an immense tangle of interdependent problems which can never be simultaneously solved.  For example: political convenience, arguments over build costs greater than budgeted, the MOD’s desperate lack of actual short-term funding availability, aggressive questioning of the CVF project by other services, the use of the prospective carriers order as a tool to force industry to re-structure, concerns over linked projects such JCA and the selected JSF F-35B, the pro-longed transition from Blair to Brown as Prime Minister, the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007, and the increasing French involvement.

The later has become a real joker in the pack.  Back in February 2006 the government said “Throughout our discussions with France and during industry-to-industry work, we have made it clear that any co-operative programme of work will not be allowed to impact on CVF timelines”.   A MOD  Memorandum dated 26 October 2006 further stated "Co-operation [with France] was only agreed on the basis that it must deliver savings without delaying the UK CVF (or French PA2) programmes"

It is now clear that France - through Thales (a partner in both the UKs CVF project and France's PA2 project) - have made proposals for the integration of the CVF and PA2 projects that will have a serious impact on the UK's plans if we believe previous warnings from senior BAE Systems officials.  However Defence Procurement Lord Drayson has recently said  “That is an intelligent way to do this … if as a result we end up with a better outcome on cost and a better outcome in terms of long term viability of the UK shipbuilding industry".

The French are notoriously good negotiators in these kind of circumstances, and concerns already identifiable include:

• Previous disappointing experiences in relation to such a close co-operation (particularly Project Horizon)
• In December 2005 the MOD announced how CVF construction work would be allocated, the loss of this work by the BAE Barrow shipyard, and possibly by the Babcock Rosyth dockyard, would be politically difficult.
• A lack of clarity over the savings - if any - that the UK MOD (rather than the French MOD) would actually achieve by such a merger of the projects
•  Final assembly of all three ships in France would be politically difficult, and has associated support implications if the currently planned upgrade of facilities at Rosyth for CVF assembly does not occur
• The French schedule for PA2 is apparently regarded as immoveable. The two British carriers would thus to be fitted around this and would thus become units 02 and 03 in the new three ship programme, with significant ISD delays compared to current plans (shifting right from 2014 and 2016 to 2017 and 2019?)