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CVF -
Déjà Vu
Although written nearly 40 years ago in the context of the proposed CVA-01 aircraft carrier, the above quotation is just as relevant today as defence cuts, arguments, delays, cost increases, and doubts about the chosen carrier fighter plague the Royal Navy’s keystone Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) project. As recently as March of this year, government spokesmen were still confidently stating that the key milestone of Main Gate (basically the approval to order the ships) would be reached this Spring, and that the first ship would enter service in 2012. Sadly these hopes have since faded when the increasingly acrimonious relationship between BAE Systems and its largest customer, the Ministry of Defence, finally came to a head at a meeting on Monday 26 April between Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon and BAE Systems Chief Executive Mike Turner. The omens for the meeting were hardly good with the newspapers full of reports that BAE Systems had put its shipyards up for sale, causing considerable annoyance at the MOD because this potentially affected several Royal Navy projects at a critical moment, and the omens were right as Mr Hoon angrily refused a demand from Mr Turner on how BAE Systems wanted to do business with the MOD in future on large defence projects. Although afterwards BAE Chairman Richard Evans told a parliamentary committee that he was willing to "eat humble pie" if the clash had offended the Defence Secretary, it was rather too late – the MOD was already making it plain that it now intended to back away from a decision made in January 2003 that BAE Systems was the preferred prime contract for the CVF “Demonstration and Manufacture” contract. The primary reason given by MOD ‘sources’ was that they simply did not accept BAE Systems’ claims that two new aircraft carriers would cost about £4 billion to build (a cut down version had been offered at £3.5 billion, but its aviation capability, and particularly its aircraft capacity were considered by the RN to be below the minimum acceptable), and that the first could not enter service before 2014. The MOD believed that its own estimates of about £2.9 billion and 2012 respectively were still realistic and achievable. It now seems that the MOD’s Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) will bring CVF project management 'in-house', albeit appointing an external company as consultants as "project integrators" and to provide specialist management skills. The carriers themselves will be built by a consortium (or “procurement committee”) consisting of major suppliers, these probably being defined as: BAE Systems, Thales, VT Group and Swan Hunter, although if Thales buys BAE Systems two Clyde shipyards it will then become very much the prima donnas - first among equals. How this structure will be affected by a decision by France to join the CVF project is uncertain, but there is no doubt that the DCN, Thales (France) and even the DGA will all be looking to play a major role at the industrial level agreed by the two governments. One thing does seem certain already, even with the most optimistic assumptions about the progress of the CVF Project, Main Gate is now not likely to be passed before summer 2005 and fabrication work can not start at the shipyards until 2008 (causing major problems at Swan Hunters, which had been relying on being able to start work on CVF in 2006), which implies that the first ship will enter service no earlier than 2014. Executives at BAE Systems will undoubtedly risk a small wry smile when this is finally admitted by the MOD. Unfortunately problems in actually building the new carriers is not the only issue affecting the CVF project, for example it remains far from certain that there will even be any fighters to actually fly from the new carriers. In 2001 the UK selected the American lead Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to meet its Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement. But the JSF design remains stubbornly over weight (originally by over 3000lbs, although this has now been reduced) which results in a reduction in the aircrafts expected performance, particularly for the STOVL enabled F-35B model that the UK plans to buy , development is running a year late, and the programme is over budget. In the USA questions continue to be asked at a very senior level about the technical viability of the STOVL variant if the weight problems are not resolved, and the financial affordability of the JSF project in general. Meanwhile, the RAF has intentionally or unintentionally done its bit to make life difficult for the RN’s carrier plans. In recent months the RAF has offered up as a defence cut its entire current Harrier GR.7 and also the expensive Harrier GR.9 upgrade, these being as an alternative to the expected elimination of its Jaguar fleet and a reduction in the Eurofighter Typhoon buy. The RAF has also suggested that JCA numbers could be cut from the currently planned 150 (90 primarily for the RAF, 60 primarily for the RN) to perhaps as few as 75 – which is not enough aircraft to simultaneously meet both land based tasks and carrier based tasks – one would have to go. The RAF is able to powerfully influence these decisions because it now totally owns and funds the JCA project, a near complete 'light blue' takeover of a project that until May 2001 was called the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft and which was originally initiated by the RN in order to find a replacement for the Sea Harrier. The RAF offer concerning the Harrier does have some logic, the Harrier GR.9 upgrade has become an increasing disappointing – it’s running late (BAE Systems has so far managed to get only 1 aircraft, rather than the scheduled 5) and its capabilities have been repeatedly cut (e.g. Storm Shadow and ASRAAM will no longer be integrated) in order to stay within budget - to the point where the Harrier GR.9/9A can no longer be considered a significant improvement upon the GR7/7A. The primary purpose of the GR.9 upgrade increasingly appears to be just as a mechanism to keep Harrier aircraft flying and viable until the planned out of service date of 2015, by which time they should be being replaced by the JSF. The sting in the tail here for the Royal Navy is that its own Sea Harrier FA.2 fighters fell victim to earlier defence cuts and will all be gone by 2006, if the RAF's Harrier’s also go in a similar timeframe then the UK will suddenly have no fixed wing aircraft able to operate from the RN’s three small “Harrier Carriers” – the Invincible Class. This would be an amazing situation given the emphasis that the government has placed since its Strategic Defence Review in 1998 upon aircraft carrier based power projection, and given that over half a billion pounds has recently been spent upgrading the Invincible's in order to squeeze the most out of them in this role. Unfortunately, if the UK really does take out of service its remaining carrier capable aircraft, then brutal logic dictates that HMS Invincible and Illustrious can be paid-off early in order to realise considerable annual savings, whilst the youngest of the three carriers, HMS Ark Royal, would be best converted to a LPH (helicopter carrier) in order to partner the RN’s only dedicated LPH - HMS Ocean. With the first CVF, HMS Queen Elizabeth, unlikely to arrive in service before 2014, and probably not fully operational with a worked up airgroup of JSF’s and Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) aircraft until 2015 or even 2016 – the RN faces the best part of a decade without any aircraft carriers in service. The corollary to this for critics of the CVF project (perhaps not least the Treasury) is that if the MOD is willing to risk going a whole decade without any carriers, clearly there is no vital need for them at all and the whole expensive CVF project should be cancelled. Even it was initially decided to press on with CVF, the RN would still face immense difficulties and costs in reconstituting its aircraft carrier capability after nearly a decade gap in fixed-wing operations, with the consequent loss of vital skills in so many areas. The RN with no CVFCurrently the RN is totally committed to CVF and is basing its future
fleet plans around these ships, but assuming that the worst does happen and that the CVF’s are never actually
ordered (the current government appears to be adverse to actually
announcing an outright cancellation of a major defence project,
particularly one that it conceived), the RN will be forced to immediately look at alternatives that can deliver a partial
capability in critical areas. In 1966-7, in the aftermath of the cancellation of the large CVA-01 fleet
carrier , this was a
helicopter carrying command cruiser that developed in to the small
Invincible class "Harrier carriers". This time around the starting
pint may be a new class of
amphibious ship. Plans are currently at a early stage for two LPH or
LHD’s that will replace both HMS Ocean and also the Invincible’s in
their secondary amphibious role in 2015-18. If CVF’s are not built then
one option is to enable these new amphibs to operate a flight of F-35B’s.
Adding this capability would significantly increase their size and cost,
and negatively impact their amphibious capabilities, but the RN would
probably happily accept this trade-off. And with CVF cancelled, the RAF
would probably magnanimously agree to occasionally provide a flight of 4 - 6 F-35B’s for the new ships - subject to availability. But with the
Harriers gone and CVF requirements no longer a driver, RAF interest could
well change from the STOVL F-35B to a cheaper and longer range, but only
land-based variant of the F-35 – leaving no fixed-wing carrier capable fighter able
to operate from even the new LPH/LHD’s unless the RN was allowed to buy a few F-35B’s
specifically for this role. |
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© 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated. |
