Editorial

RN Year in Review - 2004
28 November 2004

Slightly ahead of time, but perhaps better than my typical February dateline! 

This is the fifth time that I’ve written a “RN Year in Review” and sadly each time I've had to say that it was overall a bad year for the Royal Navy, at least in the project orientated context that this site focuses on.  For example, a year ago I said “2003 proved to be another year of ups and downs for the Royal Navy.  Firstly, the Iraq War, secondly the new aircraft carrier (CVF) saga, thirdly delays to urgently needed new construction, and fourthly the spectre of big defence cuts and disposals.”  This year has proved to more of same, only the downs have been much lower and the ups would be scarcely noticeable even on a billiard table.

2004 actually started with very high hopes that were gradually let down as winter turned in to spring turned in to summer.  Official statements had led to a serious expectation that after a 4-year Assessment Phase (it started in November 1999) the vital future aircraft carrier (CVF) project would finally pass its Main Gate milestone in March/April, and thus reach the order stage.  Instead we got only months of official silence, plus rumours that BAE Systems had been dumped as the “preferred Prime Contractor” and that a critical project review had uncovered many risks and problems – hardly surprising given that throughout the second half of 2003 the project had been devastated by cost cutting efforts and arguments between the MOD and contractors.    In July it finally became clear that another year would pass before the “Main Investment Decision” would be made, with hopefully no deja vu in early 2005 - although that seems increasingly likely as elections start to loom.  It's now five years since the CVF project passed Initial Gate in 1999, but an extraordinary amount of uncertainty and not quite final decisions continues to surround it - which in the end seem to have lead to the resignation of the highly respected Integrated Project Team Leader, Mr Ali Ali Baghaei.  What is now one of the most ridiculous factor of CVF saga is that despite all the delays, the MOD is still suggesting that the first carrier will be accepted in to service in 2012, long after that date has ceased to have any credibility with industry.  Back in 2003, France was very interested in joining the CVF project, but it is perhaps unsurprising that by May 2004 they had opted for an all-French solution for their new carrier (PA2), albeit still looking for possible areas of co-operation with the UK’s CVF. 

Other non-events then followed; the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) Main Gate was delayed yet again, this time to early 2005.  The Initial Gate for the  Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) project was missed, as was that for the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability  (MARS) – indeed we are still waiting for public domain news of the revised dates.  The Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft  (SCMR) also missed its Main Gate, and - as usual - did the Joint Casualty Treatment Ship (JCTS).

Also on 31 March 2004 the withdrawal from service of the Sea Harrier FA.2 began when 800 squadron was disbanded.  This process will be completed in March 2006 – leaving the RN with no carrier based air defence capability until the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) enters service.  Unfortunately, just as the run down of the RN's Sea Harrier force began in earnest, it was announced across the Atlantic that the F-35B JSF would be delayed by two years.  All being well, the UK can probably hope to have a grand total of 8 F-35B’s cleared for operational service by the end of 2014.  The only slight mitigating circumstance is that probably the first CVF carrier won't be in service before that date anyway!   But the expected delays to CVF and the JSF have not stopped the MOD from advancing the decommissioning of the last Invincible-class carrier (HMS Ark Royal) from 2015 to 2013.

The absolute low point of the year was reached on 21 July 2004 when the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced the UK’s biggest defence cuts since 1991 under the title "Delivering Security in a Changing World; Future Capabilities".  Despite government spin, the paper revealed by far the deepest defence cuts since the ending of the Cold War “peace dividend” was taken in 1991.  For the Royal Navy the reductions amounted to about 20% of current force levels, in stark terms it lost 14 warships: including 6 out of 31 frigates and destroyers, 3 MCMV’s, 3 patrol craft and 2 out of 10 nuclear submarines (although one was already known to be going).  The speed with which the MOD has implemented these costs has been almost indecent, with five ships having already flown their paying off pennant, and the sale of the three “surplus” Type 23 frigates to Chile believed to be imminent.  Given the negative impact that these cuts are already having on the operational capabilities of the RN, it is surprising to hear the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Alan West saying that “they made sense” - although he's also made clear that he would have preferred that they hadn't happened.  Some other devastating news in the "Delivering Security, ..” white paper was that the Type 45 destroyer programme was being cut from the 12 units so long considered to be essential, to just 8.

Amazingly, since July things have continued to get worse as more bad news has emerged.  The delay to the SCMR Initial Gate began to make sense as rumours started to circulate that the billion pound cut in helicopter procurements which was indirectly announced in the White Paper would be mostly found by cancelling SCMR outright, leaving the RN with only its small force (currently 42 airframes) of EH-101 Merlin helicopters by about 2014.  Also, funding for MASC has faded away; instead the project appears to have become the Maritime Strand of the Joint UAV Experimentation Programme (JUEP).  But most disappointing of all, in November perhaps the most exciting RN design concept since HMS Dreadnought a century ago was cancelled.  The Future Surface Combatant project originated back in 1994 as the Future Escort -  a replacement for the existing Type 22 and 23 frigates - and for a long while (c.1997-2003) it seemed likely to be a large trimaran hulled warship of revolutionary concept, but a delay in 2001, and a broadening of scope to an excessive degree have proved fatal.  In the end, too many people considered the concept to be too ambitious, too risky, and too expensive, for it to be approved.  MOD thinking for FSC (or its successor)  is now turning towards the low risk of option of using a modified Type 45 design, supplemented by a smaller warship tentatively called Global Corvette - but even if these projects proceed, the first ship isn't expected to arrive in service until 2020.  Existing frigates will now have to be run on past their 30th birthday - with the inevitable suspicion that in practise the MOD will  pay some of them off before any replacements arrive on the grounds that they have become to difficult to maintain and expensive to keep in service.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the USN with its Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project seems likely to benefit more from the UK’s FSC work, which culminated with the trimaran research vessel Triiton, than the RN ever will.

Other project news during the year … the in-service date for the first Bay-class LSD(A) was delayed by about 18 months to late 2005, and the in-service date for  the first Type 45 HMS Daring was also delayed by 18 months to May 2009.  The extra cost of running on the ancient Type 42 destroyers will be met by reducing the equipment fit of the Type 45’s – effectively by elimination of the planned Incremental Acquisition Plan.

Another development is that long time pleas by UK naval shipbuilders for the MOD to adopt a more considered approach to naval orders in order to avoid the “famine to feast to famine” cycle has finally had some reaction.  In late 2003 the MOD commissioned a report from RAND Corp to evaluate the UK situation, and a DPA team began to develop a new naval shipbuilding strategy.  Their findings are now being developed in to a programme by the Maritime Coherence Study, which in turn will be used to inform the MOD’s Equipment Plan  – how’s that for rapid response!  The general conclusion seems to be that the shipbuilding industry will indeed have trouble coping with MOD future orders, but rather than advance orders to alleviate the current “famine” as industry hoped, the problem seems to have already become an excuse for the MOD to actually delay orders and projects in order to reduce the forecast "feast"!

The only naval order almost awarded by the MOD during 2004 (on 13 December VT Group announced that had entered contract negotiations) was for a single new OPV(H) to replace the two existing Castle-class, i.e. the Royal Navy  entire “New Construction Programme” for 2004 was one patrol vessels of under 2000 tonnes - as recently as the late 1970’s three frigates/destroyers and a nuclear submarine was the minimum ever seen.  The intensive politics and lobbying that surrounded this order, which is worth about one half of a Eurofighter Typhoon fighter, is perhaps a sign of just how little work UK shipyards have to fight over, despite the governments claim to have the largest naval shipbuilding programme since WW2.

Good news is hard to come by, but the overstretched Royal Navy has as ever performed sterling service around the world, and been a credit to the United Kingdom.  The Royal Marines perhaps deserve a particular mention, they have fought off attempts by the Army to take control of it, apparently the new Commando 21 organisation is proving to be a success, and the hard worked 3 Commando Brigade is deservedly  recognised as a big reason why the UK can still “punch above its weight” militarily.  The UK's amphibious force has been greatly enhanced by the arrival in service at last of the Albion-class LPD/Command ships, and perhaps 2005 will see the RM’s finally get to order the new hovercraft that they badly want.  Also, thankfully the Astute SSN project seems to be on the road to recovery, the first unit is still expected to enter service in 2009, just four years later than were being told in 2002.

The coming year will see the bicentennial of the Battle of Trafalgar.  Let's hope Nelson won’t be turning in his grave on come the 21st of October (or the International Fleet Review in June), and I personally hope a year from now  to be able to write a far more positive editorial.

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