Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA)

(formally the Future Joint Combat Aircraft - FJCA,
 formally the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft - FCBA)

Part 2

Graphic of a F-35B, on its approach to land on a CVF vertically

Indecision and review

The STOVL variant of the American lead Joint Strike Fighter was selected as JCA in September 2002 - this now being the Lockheed-Martin F-35B.  

The three years since September 2002 saw the JSF programme buffeted by engineering issues, the most serious being weight problems impacting on STOVL variant performance, rising costs and a major restructuring of the development programme.  Although the UK has expressed satisfaction that the STOVL weight growth problem has been resolved, one consequence is that the JCA in-service date has slipped from late 2012 to late 2014.  More recently, revised assumptions as to future fast jet numbers have prompted new operational analysis to examine how the JCA variant choice affects the UK's Future Combat Air Capability. Whereas the RAF had at one stage aspired to procure a new manned aircraft as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS), the recent demise of the FOAS programme means that the fast jet frontline will now comprise just two types - the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JCA.

(Above) By mid-2004 the projected STOVL performance of the F-35B  was failing to meet the UK's requirements by a considerable margin - note the excessive take off-runs and inadequate bring back ("VL BB").  Projected combat radius was also a concern.

In early 2004 Aviation Week magazine repeatedly reported that the UK was re-considering its commitment to the STOVL F-35B as result of performance issues (largely due to weight problems) and likely delays in the schedule of STOVL variant compared with the CV F-35C.  The magazine said the UK was considering a buy of 80-85 F-35C's instead.  Other reports confirmed that the UK was reconsidering its choice of the F-35B rather than the F-35C, with a final decision then expected in late 2004 or the first half of 2005.  .  However by June 2004 Lockheed Martin appeared to be have considerable  success in resolving the problems related to the JSF programme and in particular the F-35B, and a switch by the UK seemed increasingly unlikely, although the reports give an indication of the intense pressure to perform as promised that was on the Lockheed-Marin JSF team in late 2003 and early 2004.  

Even more confusingly, after the defence cuts announced in July 2004 which reduced the operational requirement for RAF offensive strike aircraft to just 64 deployable front-line aircraft, there were suggestions that some elements in the RAF are now advocating a switch from the STOVL F-35B to the CTOL F-35C variant in order to avoid having an excessive proportion of less capable (at least in terms of range and payload) STOVL aircraft in the shrunken force.  There are also reports that clearing the F-35B for ski-jump operations will be bigger technical challenge than originally expected, with expensive changes necessary to both the undercarriage nose gear and to the vectored thrust nozzle and control system, and UK will have to pay most of the bill. 

By February 2005 it became clear that the MOD would keep its options open as long as possible as to whether to complete the CVF's in a STOVL. CTOL or hybrid configuration, and a final decision may not be made until as late as the end of 2008 - when the MOD has indicated that it plans to place its JCA production order.  However Lockheed Martin officials have stated that in order to fix the production plan, they need firm commitments from the international partners with regard to unit numbers and delivery schedules by December 2006.  This will require memoranda of understanding at governmental level, and discussions were expected to begin in Spring 2005.

There was now a strong perception that the £8 billion JCA selection decision was made rather prematurely, and that the UK did not seek a hard enough bargain before committing its money (about £1.5 billion so far).  An information note raised by the MoD's Investment Approvals Board (IAB) in late 2004 judged that there was insufficient evidence to change the variant decision, but at the same time generated new questions as to the whole life costs of the STOVL and CV aircraft. Work in progress is intended to produce a review note to the IAB later in 2005.  

In early July 2005, an article by Janes Defence Weekly summarised the situation, stating that the UK is reviewing which variant of JSF will best meet its Joint Combat Aircraft requirement  and that a decision will inform the CVF main investment decision due in early 2006.  The analysis takes into account more mature JSF cost and technical data and revised force mix assumptions to determine whether the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the JSF remains best equipped to meet its JCA requirement.

A senior MoD source told JDW: "We remain open [as to the JCA variant] and are reviewing the business case in light of developments since the IAB made its initial decision in favour of STOVL. This process is being informed by the increased cost and technical maturity in the JSF programme and the changes in our own planning assumptions on the Future Combat Air Capability. Operational analysis is ongoing. We need to revisit our earlier assumptions and take account of future fast jet capability in the round in order to have full confidence in the variant selection in advance of the CVF Main Gate decision," added the MoD source.

Current planning assumptions were predicated on the acquisition of the F-35B STOVL variant to be operated from both carriers and shore bases by a joint force comprising both Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) personnel. However, officials admit that a better understanding of JSF cost and technical issues, and the revised assumptions as to the future UK fast jet force mix, mean that the option to instead go for the US Navy's F-35C carrier variant (CV) has not been foreclosed.  It is understood that operational analysis was examining the case for, and affordability of, both a single type and mixed JCA fleet, with additional consideration being given as to how the JCA fleet might take on missions previously earmarked for FOAS. 

Late 2005 also saw increasingly strident official complaints about the American failure to agree a technology transfer waiver for the UK to the USA's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  The waiver would have enabled the UK to acquire and make use of certain US technologies without going through a tortuous license approval process, instead the UK is faced with the prospect of not being able to upgrade and modify its own F-35 aircraft independently, or even fully maintain them. Things perhaps came to head in January 2006 when it was clear that the F136 engine, jointly being developed by Americas GE-Aviation and Britain’s Rolls-Royce as an alternative engine for the JSF (and a near certain choice for fitting to the UK’s production aircraft) was likely to be cancelled, despite the personal representation of Prime Minister Blair to President Bush. [The Senate & Congress later restored funding for another year]

Progress on the review was clearly slower than expected, and in March 2006 AMI International reported that the UK was still reviewing its selection of the F-35 JSF for its the JCA requirement after enigmatic references to a "Plan B" alternative.  However in early 2006 BAE Systems also received a MOD contract to lead the integration of the F-35 with the CVF.  BAE Systems will ensure that the ship’s design integrates effectively with the F-35 aircraft system.

Plan B

By early 2006 UK officials were emphasizing that in case the issues in relation to the JSF couldn’t be resolved, they were having to think the unthinkable and consider a pull out from the JSF programme at the end of 2006.  Lord Drayson, Minister for Defence Procurement, said: “There has to be a Plan B. We need to make sure we have done the work needed to ensure we have an option.”

In special hearings before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 14 March 2006, British, Australian and Italian officials expressed their unhappiness about the lack of consultation in U.S. handling of the JSF program and technology transfer delays.  Minister for Defence Procurement Lord Drayson issued a stark warning that unless Britain's technology access needs are met, it will quit the JSF program. The British government's stance appears uncompromising. Either provide the U.K. with "operational sovereignty" on its Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, or watch London pull out.

"We have no reason to believe that our discussions with the administration will not be successful, but without the technology transfer to give us the confidence to deliver an aircraft fit to fight on our terms, we will not be able to buy these aircraft," Drayson cautioned. "I am spelling this out because it is so important to make our intentions clear. I know the British can be accused of understatement."   The STOVL F-35B remains the most likely choice but other options include a move to the CTOL F-35C or a split buy.  Even a navalised variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon  is now being seriously re-considered as "Plan B" if the UK pulled out of the JSF project at the end of 2006, something that would have been unthinkable in 2003 or 2004. 

During the summer of 2006 the UK Ministry of Defence submitted a list of its requirements to the US Department of Defence and required a satisfactory answer before 6th December 2006, warning that otherwise it might not sign a memorandum of understanding to move from the JSF system development and demonstration phase to the manufacturing phase of the project.

The problem of purchasing an alternative aircraft for JCA under a “Plan B” is that none of the contenders can be considered to be a fully satisfactory alternative to the F-35 JSF. Buying the less capable American-made Boeing F/A-18E Super would be a farcical decision after just pulling out of the JSF project; a further development of the Harrier would result in an inferior and non-stealthy subsonic product compared to F-35B; there would be minimum UK content in a purchase of French made Dassault Rafale M’s; while developing a marinised version of the land based Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000 would be expensive.

The MOD appears to be internally considering the implications of converting its planned Tranche 3 batch of 88 Eurofighter Typhoon’s in to a navalised “Sea Typhoon” variant suitable for operation from CVF.  However the likely costs and difficulties can not be underestimated, expected modifications include changes of materials to reduce corrosion, the addition of an arrestor hook, a larger and thicker wing with power folding, and more powerful vectored thrust EJ200 engines. Even then, there would remain fundamental issues and risks such as the aircrafts canards restricting the pilots view during high angle of attack carrier landings.

BAE Systems’ Chief Executive Officer, Mike Turner, told the House of Commons Defence Select Committee on 28th February 2006: "it is possible to navalise Typhoon. It is not what we would recommend, because if Joint Strike Fighter proceeds, and we believe it will, I think, in terms of capability for the Armed Forces of the UK, it is the right aircraft, but, indeed, as Lord Drayson has made clear, there needs to be a fall-back in case something goes wrong. Therefore, we would suggest there should be an investigation into navalising Typhoon as very much a fall-back solution. We do not see any other fall-back solution."  The last comment has to be considered in the context of BAE Systems 37% stake in each Eurofighter built. BAE Systems is likely to lose much of its anticipated JSF workload if the UK pulled out the programme and is understandably keen to ensure that it develops and build the alternative. BAE Systems has not yet been consulted by the MOD about this possibility, but the MOD have the results of earlier studies in the late1990’s to draw on.

The French have also made a move, during a meeting in London on 24 January, the French Defence Minister made a verbal offer to her UK counterpart, John Reid to supply Rafale M carrier capable fighters. Until recently the French would never have bothered to make such a suggestion given the UK’s costly commitment to the JSF, and if they had it would have been politely brushed off. Instead, it’s believed that a lengthy discussion followed, and Dr Reid agreed that the French offer would be considered further. There are clearly potential economies associated with the two UK and one French CVF being designed, built and operated to nearly identical designs (it would cost the UK only slightly more to complete its carriers in a CTOL configuration with catapults and arresting gear, than the currently planned STOVL configuration). There are also synergies and economies of scale arising from the two countries operating identical carrier fighters (Rafale M), particularly given the small numbers (60-80?) that each country requires. In the past the French have also raised the possibility of a joint Anglo-French E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning and control squadron.

Whether the MOD was actually bluffing or serious in relation to a JSF pull-out remained to be seem – although the suspicion was always that they are employing strong negotiating tactics to put pressure on the Americans.

Current Situation

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the next phase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme - production, sustainment and follow-on development (PSFD) - was signed on 12 December 2006 by Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Lord Drayson on behalf of the UK.  The MoU sets out the framework for purchasing JSF and supporting and upgrading it through life. It also provides for the pooling of the partner nations' collective buying power in a common support solution, and of their resources and technology in follow-on development.   It does not, however, formally commit the UK to buying any aircraft.  The UK's increase in financial commitment at this stage is $58 million ( £34 million).

Previously, in October 2006 Tom Burbage, Lockheed's Martin's F-35 program manager was quoted as saying that the UK was now planning to purchase 138 aircraft over the 2011-27 period, including around 80 F-35B STOVL aircraft to form four front-line squadrons to support carrier operations under the original JCA requirement.  At least another two squadrons could be formed as the crewed element of a successor deep-strike capability to the RAF's Tornado GR.4 fleet against the RAF's Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement -  previously called the Future Combat Air Capability (FCAC), which in turn was until June 2005 the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS).

The UK will have two F-35's in third batch of low rate initial production (LRIP-III), delivered in 2011 and then forming a small UK operational evaluation unit to be based in the USA. 

UK production (Block 3 standard ) deliveries will begin with LRIP-IV in 2012.  Sources are confusing, but appears that the four Joint Combat Aircraft Force (JCAF) front-line carrier capable squadrons will have 12 aircraft each (although 9 has also been suggested), plus an operational conversion unit of 14 aircraft.

The FCAC force will have two deep strike squadrons at least 8 aircraft each, plus an operational conversion unit of 6 aircraft.  The deep strike aircraft are expected to be based on the USN's carrier variant, the F-35C, as this has the longest range and payload.   However for RAF land based service many carrier compatibility features will be deleted (replaced by ballast if necessary) or modified in order to reduce maintenance costs, e.g. the folding wings will probably be permanently locked open.

The latest Equipment Plan 2007 (EP07) has delayed the JCA in-service date to 2017 in an effort to reduce budgetary pressures  The problem seems to be that hopes that some or all of the UK's planned Typhoon Tranche 3 buy could be dropped were dashed when legal advice showed that up to £1 billion compensation that would then be payable by the UK to its partners in the programme,  EP07 thus allows for the ordering of 88 Typhoon aircraft in 2009 at about £70 million each.  JCA funding problems have also not been helped by a 20% real increase since 2001 in the price that the UK will pay for its F-35's - with the MOD extremely reluctant to try to claw some of this back by deleting the requirement for UK-only weapons such as ASRAAM and Storm Shadow.  This increase will be even more dramatic if the Pound Sterling starts to lose any of its significant appreciation against the US Dollar since 2001.

The UK MOD now intends to  formally order two or three "Operational Test and Evaluation" F-35B's for effectively trials purposes in December 2008 or January 2009 (the American FY2009), but this may well slip up to a a year given delays in F-35B flight testing and the deferment of the JCA in-service date.

The MOD then won't make any decision on the size and timing of any further small purchases until the end of 2010, with a final decision on the a larger production order not expected until December 2013.  This is all to the great dismay of Lockheed Martin, which has been seeking (indeed almost demanding) contracted F-35 orders from the JSF international partners since 2006 - but if the only Level 1 partner is deferring orders it will  take significant inducements (pricing guarantees, penalties for late delivery, industrial offsets ...) to persuade some of the others to sign and commitment their money.  The MOD has now given up its allocated early F-35 delivery slots to Australia and possibly Israel if rumours are correct.

 

Costs 

The cost of new fighters is extremely difficult to accurately estimate and usefully compare due to: the massive R&D costs which may or may not be included in a quoted number; the often huge price difference between a basic equipment fit and a "fully featured" aircraft; the bundling or otherwise of spares (including engines), weapons, support, maintenance equipment, training, etc.

While now a historical debate, it's still interesting to compare the approximate unarmed unit costs for the JCA contenders as being suggested in 2001.  Derived partly from export prices offered in fighter competitions, in Year 2000 prices they were:

• F-35 JSF - $50-60m depending on variant  [DOD/MOD estimate]
• Eurofighter EF-2000 Typhoon - $71-80m *  [RAF estimate & Greek Fighter competition]
• Dassault Rafale M - $60-70m  [French Parliamentary Finance Committee estimate, offer to India, Greek fighter competition]
• Boeing Super Hornet FA-18E - $65-75m  [DoD estimates]

*A navalised Typhoon would reportedly have cost at least 25% extra, i.e. $89-100m. 

Although these costs are significantly more than the basic configuration "fly-away" unit costs that are often and somewhat misleadingly quoted (e.g. as little as $40-50 million for Rafale) and presumably include a small profit for the manufacturer, they still exclude most research & development and in-service support costs. Development costs are high for the F-35 (for just the UK alone, approximately $3.3bn in total at 2001 prices), would have been significant for Sea Typhoon and substantial for a Anglo'ised Rafale.  A Super Hornet could be bought nearly “off-the-shelf”. 

With the JSF programme, the original emphasis was deliberately on affordability over performance - although affordability is a relative term!  The original FY1994 JSF unit flyaway costs of the variants for the different services were: US Air Force (CTOL) - $28 million; UK/USMC (STOVL)- $35m; USN (CV) - $38m and are still often mis-quoted.   These figures were still being mentioned in early 2001, by which time inflation had clearly made them rather deceptive, and importantly they excluded a 10% price hike that the JSF Project Office allowed the manufacturers in order to cover customer changes in specification and performance requirements. 

Interestingly the MOD has repeatedly said that it expects the unit cost of its JSF's to be about £40m ($56m) in 2000-1 prices, while in October 2001, at the time of the SDD decision announcement, it was officially stated that the CTOL variant would cost about $40m, and the CV and STOVL variants about $50m "in today's dollars".  These numbers can be compared to $25 million for the F-16, $36 million for the Harrier, and $48 million for the F/A-18C/D Hornet (again, in 2000 dollars).  Although the USAF JSF variant is often said to cost the same as a F-16, this is in fact a major misunderstanding of the figures on offer from the Pentagon.

In July 2002, about nine months in to the SDD phase, Lockheed Martin claimed that JSF costs were still holding, quoting flyaway prices of: US Air Force (CTOL) variant - $37 million; USMC (STOVL)- $46m; USN (CV)  $48m (all in 2002 dollars).  If unit procurement costs rather than flyaway costs are used then the numbers increased again - the unit procurement price being estimated at $43m for the CTOL version of the JSF and at slightly more than $50m for STOVL and CV variants. 

There were soon many reports indicating that the manufacturers and their suppliers were finding it very difficult to meet performance within promised costs.  For example, it has been reported that the DoD has had to relax a number of the original JSF performance targets (maximum speed, acceleration, range, etc...) in order to reduce risks and keep JSF development and production costs within budget.  Another change is that the originally planned 90% parts commonality between the three JSF versions is now as low as 70% by value, which will increase support costs.

In mid-2004 USAF and JSF programme sources said that latest current dollar cost estimates were in the mid-$40 millions for the CTOL variant, and mid-$50 millions for both the STOVL and CV variants. 

In early 2005 the GAO documented the cost escalation:

Unit flyaway costs in millions of fiscal year 2002 dollars
	November 1996 (program start)	October 2001 (system development start)	As of January 2005
Conventional takeoff and landing variant (F-35A)	$31.5	$37.0	$44.8
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)	$33.7-39.3	$45.8	$54.0-61.1
Carrier variant (F-35C)	$34.9-42.7	$47.8	$55.0-61.0

These figures are all “performance and target cost” figures that assume that the project will come in to budget and with zero further price growth, the GAO estimated that they would in fact be exceeded by 47-51%, depending on the variant.  By this time, the CBO also believed that the likely unit procurement costs were $65 million for the CTOL version and about $77 million for the other two. According to the GAO “current estimates for the program acquisition unit cost are about $100 million, and the total estimated cost to own an aircraft over its life cycle is $240 million.”

In September 2006 the USAF put the unit costs of the F-35A at $48 million, the F-35B at $62 million, and the F-35C at $63 million.

A Lockheed Martin X-35 Technology Demonstrator for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

In March 2007 the GAO revisited the programme.  and that since the DOD had establishing a new FY2004 baseline, average procurement unit costs had increased from $82 million to almost $95 million and the program acquisition unit costs (i.e. including development)  has increased from $100 million to over $112 million.  Although JSF no longer looks quite such a bargain when compared to alternatives - it has to be noted that the price remains very competitive, the RAF expects to pay an average unit cost of £66.7 million (about $132 million in early 2007) for its 144 Tranche 1 and 2 Typhoon's.

To control unit acquisition costs it was essential that the originally expected 3,000+ aircraft production was achieved in order to spread fixed costs over a large number of aircraft and thus to keep the average F-35 unit system price down, but already the USA has substantially cut its anticipated F-35 buy and the UK is expected to follow - inevitably increasing unit costs.   Another issue is that of foreign participation. Foreign partners (the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Australia) have a role in the JSF’s development program and have said they might ultimately buy a total of about 700 aircraft.  However, no binding purchasing agreements are due to be signed before 2008, and several countries, including Australia, Norway, and the Netherlands, have recently expressed concern at the JSF’s rising costs and delays.  

If the real cost of F-35 continues to increase significantly it seems inevitable that the MoD will have to make considerable trade-off's in aircraft capability (i.e. the standard of equipment in UK aircraft) versus airframe numbers to stay within its budget.

 

JCA Budget
In 1997 the UK MoD stated that the estimated unit production cost for the UK JSF STOVL version was £21.6 million, at the then exchange rates this was equivalent to the $35m the USA was quoting.  Given the vastly improved capability of JSF, it compared very favourably with the £14.5 million cost of a Sea Harrier FA.2 at that time.  

In late 2000 JSF was provisionally selected to meet the JCA requirement and in January 2001 the MoD announced that approval had been given for expenditure of £1.3 billion ($2 billion) (2000-01 outturn prices) to cover the UK contribution to SDD phase (formally known as the EMD phase) and a further £600 m ($883 million) for additional work on national requirements, including integration of JSF with the new aircraft carriers. This will be paid over an 11 year period beginning in October 2001. There had already been expenditure of £160 million (2000-01 outturn prices) to cover both the UK's $200 million contribution to the US JSF Concept Demonstration Phase and UK Feasibility Studies. The MoD said that it expected UK JSF production costs to be "under £40 million" ($56m) each.

Overall numbers and the choice of F-35 JSF variant, both of which have yet to be determined, will drive the final cost of the programme, but it's currently expected to be in the region of £7 to £10 billion (2000-01 outturn prices).   In May 2001 the following estimated procurement costs for JSF were given by the MOD:

Concept Development Phase	£160 m
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase	£1300m
Expenditure on national requirements	£600m
Production cost of 150 aircraft at £40 million each	£6000m
Total	£8060 m

Peak expenditure was considered likely to occur in 2013-14 and 2014-15. 

Costs have increased substantially since 2001.

It was revealed in 2005 that the MOD had effectively cancelled much of the "expenditure on national requirements".  Some £368 million was 'saved' by the cancellation or deferment of  upgrades for UK weapons such as Brimstone.

 

JCA Timescales
Major recent or future programme milestones are:

• Autumn 2000 - First flights of JSF demonstrators X.32 and X.35
• Late 2000 - Systems Requirement Document (Staff Requirement) and Equipment Acquisition Committee (EAC) approval for the next phase of the programme
• January 2001 - UK provisionally selects JSF for JCA
• January 2001 - UK signs a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the USA committing it to the JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase
• 26 October 2001 - Lockheed Martin awarded the SDD Phase contract for its F-35
• 20 September 2002 - F-35B STOVL variant selected as FJCA
• [March 2006 - Sea Harrier FA.2 leaves service]
• 12 December 2006 - UK signs Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Production Sustainment and Follow-on Development of the Joint Strike Fighter.
• Mid 2008 - First flight of the F-35B JSF

The following dates are best estimates based on current information in the public domain:

• January 2009: UK places order for 2 or 3 Operational Test and Evaluation JSF's
• 2012: First UK aircraft delivery
• 2013:  Production order placed
• 2017:  JCA In-Service-Date (limited initial operational capability with about 8 aircraft). 
• 2019-20: The Harrier is taken out of service, about 50 years after entering service on April 1, 1969!
• 2020:  First F-35B equipped JCA squadron operationally deployed on a CVF  
• c.2027: JCA deliveries complete

 

JCA Delivery Schedule
A US DOD planning document dated November 2001 showed year by year how the UK F-35 aircraft would be delivered (orders would need to be placed approximately two years earlier), divided into 4 categories of test, training, operations and attrition.    At this point in time the MOD was still planning on the JCA entering service in 2012.

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Total
Training		4	0	4	4	2	2										16
Test	2																2
Operations		2	8	6	8	10	10	4									48
Attrition									8	12	12	12	12	12	12	4	84
Total	2	6	8	10	12	12	12	4	8	12	12	12	12	12	12	4	150
Cumulative Total	2	8	16	26	38	50	62	66	74	86	98	110	122	134	146	150

Note that actual aircraft delivery will occur about three years after order.

This old document said that the UK would have 4 operational squadrons of 12 aircraft with 18 pilots each plus a training squadron of 16 aircraft.  Attrition aircraft would replace those lost in squadron service and any excess would go into long term storage. Squadron aircraft would be cycled through storage to ensure the fleet accumulated hours evenly across airframes.

An approximately one-two year slippage on the JSF SDD phase and low rate production was approved by the DOD's Defense Acquisition Board on 17 June 2004, and the MOD and DOD adjusted their delivery schedule accordingly. 

A GAO document dated March 2005 said that a preliminary DOD planning documented included planned buy quantities for the United Kingdom of 2 aircraft in fiscal year 2009, 4 aircraft in fiscal year 2010, 9 aircraft in fiscal year 2011, 9 aircraft in fiscal year 2012, and 10 aircraft in fiscal year 2013.

In February 2007, the American GAO published another document with following table, note that the UK buy has been reduced to 138 and quantities reduced in the early years.  The objective at this point the MOD's objective was still a 2014 entry in to service for JCA.

In mid 2007 the MOD's new Equipment Plan 07 included a three-year delay to JCA  entry in to service to 2017.

 

Arrival of the JCA

Lockheed Martin X-35 concept demonstrator in flight.

The Joint Force Harrier (JFH) will eventually transform in to the Joint Combat Aircraft Force (JCAF). 

Initial indications (c. 2001) were that the UK would buy about 150 FCBAs to equip four front line squadrons of 12 aircraft plus one second-line joint Training/OCU squadron of 16 aircraft.

Current indications (late 2006) are for a JCA buy of around 80 F-35B's - covering front line units, training aircraft and attrition.  Its expected that these will equip four carrier capable  front-line squadrons (two predominately RAF, two predominately RN) plus one second-line joint Training/OCU squadron of 16 aircraft.  JCAF squadron designations will probably remain the same as now, i.e. 800 and [eventually] 801 NAS; 1(F), IV and 20(R) RAF.  It has been suggested that that an 80 aircraft buy will in practice only allow a 9 aircraft front-line squadron strength - the same as the squadrons have today with the Harrier.

In 2006 MOD expected that 2 UK instrumented test aircraft (upgradeable later to production standards) would be completed in 2011, the first early production F-35B's (hopefully Block 3 standard) would be delivered to the UK in 2012, and that the JCA would formally enter service in December 2014 with 8 operational aircraft. However unofficial reports in mid-2007 indicated an up to three year delay to these timescales was noe likely due to financial constraints 

The UK had planned to form the JCA Intensive Flying Trials Unit (IFTU) by 2014, with carrier compatibility trials taking place on the first of the new CVF's - HMS Queen Elizabeth - during the second half of the year.  Assuming an aggressive timeline, it was expected that the IFTU would become the Operational Evaluation Unit (OEU) squadron in early 2015, a training squadron (Operational Conversion Unit - OCU) would form later in 2015; and the first front-line Harrier GR.9 squadron (800 or 801 NAS) would begin converting to the F-35B in 2016, becoming operational in 2017 (some rumours in late 2006 suggested that 2018 had become the target date, but even 2019 now may be optimistic), with the other squadrons following at roughly one year intervals.  The RN biased squadrons forming the Naval Strike Wing will be primarily responsible for CVF based operations, but the RAF units will need to be also used if more than one F-35 squadron is to be maintained on the operational CVF for most of the year.  Whether the necessary RAF "buy-in" to commit scarce planes and personnel to carrier based ops remains one of the issues still threatening the CVF and JCA projects.

The Harrier GR.9/9A was originally expected to go out of service (OSD) in 2015 but this has already been extended to 2017, the MOD and BAE Systems have been investigating whether a slippage to 2018-19 is possible and this should be expected.

UK JCA deliveries will be completed with the delivery of the final unit - previously assumed to be no. 150, now apparently 138 - in about 2027. 

 

Basing and Support

The Royal Air Force is planning to base its JSFs at RAF Lossiemoth in Scotland and are currently planning the facility in terms of an MRU on that base.   The base also will "probably" be the location of an integrated training center. 

BAE Systems Chief Executive Mike Turner has been a vocal advocate of the U.K. having a Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility, but Lockheed Martin officials say the the country "is still working on the numbers to see if there really is a solid case. "   Italy has already definitely decided to establish its own FACO, which is expected to also assemble JSF's for the Netherlands.

 

 

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