Notes

The French Navy has long had a requirement to build a companion to its new nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle.  In December 2005, it was revealed that this would be derivative of the UK's Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) design, but it was long road to reach this point.

 As early as 1999 the French officially approached the UK suggesting co-operation between the two countries, and as a result a joint "Future Carrier Working Group" was established.  There were also extensive discussions between the UK's Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and the equivalent French Délegation Générale pour l'Armement (DGA).  In May 2000 a report by a French Senate committee considering the need for a second French aircraft carrier recommended investigatin co-operation with the United Kingdom.  

A decision against another nuclear carrier could spell the end of the country’s four-decade-old nuclear shipbuilding programme, which has made France the only nation other than the United States to operate nuclear carriers. The decision will influence the choice of power for the Barracuda – the successor to France’s Rubis class of nuclear attack submarines.

One development in October 2003 was that apparently the USA warned the UK that it would consider French involvement in CVF as being a major problem from its point of view.  If it forms the view that JSF information might get across to the French, then the flow of that information to the UK will be stopped, a very serious issue given the scale of UK's involvement with the F-35.

On 26 October 2003, the Sunday Times newspaper reported: "The British and French governments are close to a historic deal that could see France buy a copy of the two multi-billion aircraft carriers being built for the Royal Navy.  .... Discussions have gone on between the British and French governments at official and ministerial level in recent weeks, and a memorandum of understanding is expected soon. ....  A final decision is expected by the end of the year."

The Sunday Times report was however rather premature.  On 5 November 2003 a Commission of the French National Assembly issued a report discussing the options for PA2 with the associated advantages and disadvantages, and expressing a preference for nuclear propulsion.  Soon afterwards the French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie was quoted as saying that France would decided on the propulsion mode for PA2 by the end of the year, if nuclear was dropped she had already told her UK counterpart (Geoffrey Hoon) in September that the French Ministry of Defense would need final information on CVF from the UK by June 2004 if it was to be considered when making a final decision on the format of the final decision as to PA2 design in the second half of that year.  The later is probably code that by June 2004 the UK must have finally made up its mind on the CVF design that it wants, and this must be suitably sized  for French CTOL requirements (designs the UK considered in summer 2003 were too small), if CVF is to be considered for PA2.  Any further delays to CVF would increasingly pressurise French plans for PA2 to be in service by  2015.

On 14 January 2004, the newspapers Les Echos and the London Financial Times reported that France had opted for a conventional propulsion system for its second aircraft carrier, they claimed that the decision was taken by President Jacques Chirac and Michele Alliot-Marie, Defense Minister on January 5, and was expected to be announced late in March.  By now DCN, the state warship builder, which had lobbied for the nuclear option, had changed tack and now accepted the approach.  A DCN spokesman said: "Every defence project must take into account the industrial co-operation dimension."

It was claimed that this decision revived prospects of a joint procurement with the UK involving three ships, the FT said that "a contract to build two carriers for the UK was awarded to BAE Systems and Thales last year, with the UK defence contractor leading the project.  But the French government hopes its decision in favour of a conventional system for a second carrier to complement the nuclear- powered Charles de Gaulle will cause the Ministry of Defence to think again.  In particular, it hopes to exploit strained relations between BAE Systems and the ministry to see a joint project relaunched under French industrial leadership." 

The papers also gave some first details of the design of the new ship.  Thales, now partnered by DCN, proposed a conventional carrier of 280 metres length and 58,000 tonnes - this was a DCN design study title Projet Romeo.  If ordered the hull construction would be sub-contracted to Chantiers de l'Atlantique in Saint-Nazaire, but fitting-out would be by DCN in Brest.  The newspaper reports stated that the design would be based on the hull of the new Cunard liner, Queen Mary 2, but this appears to be the reporter getting confused by that fact that a similar podded propulsion system is proposed, and that the PA2 hull would be constructed by the same yard that constructed QM2. 

On 12 February 2004 the Guardian reported that political and industry sources said that Britain and France were set to share the costs of designing and building three aircraft carriers in a further rapprochement since the rows over the war in Iraq,  said yesterday.  The move was triggered by negotiations between Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, and his French counterpart, Michèle Alliot-Marie.  A senior industry executive said after talks in Paris: "The French navy are happy to be part of the UK programme, and this could help the UK government out of the embarrassing dilemma that we believe the ships cannot be delivered with the required capability for less than £4bn."

On 13 February 2004 it was announced by the Office of the French President, Jacques Chirac, that following a recommendation by the Prime Minister, the President of the Republic had chosen conventional propulsion for the second aircraft carrier which France intended to acquire.  The statement said that the choice was perfectly adapted to the operational needs for decades to come, and opened good prospects for cooperation with the United Kingdom.  The Office also said that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had phoned Chirac in order to thank him for the decision.  In London, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said that the French decision: "opens the way for cooperation between industries on either side of the channel in order to satisfy the respective needs of the two navies. ...  The decision is particularly significant in this year marking the centenary of the Entente Cordiale and it will help reinforce the defence capabilities of Europe as well as Franco-British cooperation."  French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie said Chirac's decision was: "a European choice. We will reinforce our cooperation with the British navy."  The president of the French National Assembly's defence committee Guy Teissier said the decision was "first of all political - because on the diplomatic level it opens up the possibility of Franco-British cooperation and supports the establishment of a European defence with Europe's foremost military power."

In a press release dated 20 February 2004, DCN reluctantly put aside its preference for nuclear propulsion and an updated CdeG design, stating: "Following major contributions to the preliminary design effort, DCN will now gear up for the design phase proper and demonstrate once again its expertise as a prime contractor for sophisticated warship programmes. ...  DCN looks forward to the opportunity to play a pivotal role in this project and work closely with new and established partners."

A common collaborative Anglo-French carrier project is politically very attractive, and it should theoretically be cheaper for the UK at least than a purely national project because of shared design costs, reduced build costs, and economies of scale from ordering 3 sets of everything rather than 2.  However in private senior Royal Navy officers continue to express reservations about the possible impact in terms of timescales and cost overheads of having to incorporate France and French companies in to the project, and the requirements of the French Navy requirements in to the design.  Arguments over work share, costs and management are almost inevitable.  Unfortunately some recent Anglo-French collaborative defence projects (e.g. the Horizon CNGF) have been notably unsuccessful, with timescales slipping many years (5-10) and costs soaring (40-100% above the cost of a purely national project according to a NAO report published in 2001.  Subsequent British parliamentary "post-mortems" have concluded that the problems were largely due to French insistence on un-equitable and unworkable management and industrial structures, while simultaneously the systems specification became ever less suited to UK needs.  Some people find it hard to believe that a joint Anglo-French carrier project will have more favourable results for the UK.  

In late February 2004 reports also appeared that BAE Systems was prepared to relinquish its status as the Prime Contractor role for the CVF Project, the French companies Thales and DCN being the eager but rival heirs apparent.  A BAE Systems source stated: "The Government may be keen for political reasons to allow the French in on this deal, but the reality is that they (the French) will want a slice of the action.  The project will become severely delayed and the Americans have told us they are not keen to share their technology with the French." 

On 26 February 2004, Mr Turner, Chief Executive of BAE Systems, expressed his concern about the attempts by the UK and French Governments to co-operate on building their new aircraft carriers. He said that such a move would be plagued by complications and potentially delayed delivery of the British carriers.  “I would be very cautious about the idea. I’m not sure what would be in it for our armed forces,” he said. “But at the end of the day we do what our customer (the UK Government) wants.  ... You never have negotiations with the French where you come out winning. At best you come out even.  So I would approach it with great caution.”.   Mr Turner said the Anglo-French carrier deal could also badly affect a technology transfer deal by the UK with the US to allow it access to sensitive American defence technology.  Industrial collaboration between the UK and France on CVF may help reduce the costs of the two Royal Navy carriers but ironically, it will almost certainly dash BAE's hopes of the technology transfer deal governing the JSF because of the enmity between the French and Americans.  BAE Systems needs this to bid for work on the JSF and in the future to independently enhance the British variant, "You could say goodnight to anything on JSF," said Mr Turner.

As attempts to forge a common Anglo-French design for CVF/PA2 foundered, the French Ministry of Defense began to urge DCN and Thales to collaborate rather than compete for PA2.

On 4 June 2004, DCN and Thales Naval France announced the creation of a joint company (controlled by DCN) to lead and be prime contractor for the PA2 program.  The Thales press release stated:

"DCN and Thales have decided to combine their strengths to propose to jointly lead the future French aircraft carrier programme (PA2), and have set up an integrated Prime Contract Office that will be placed under the responsibility of a jointly owned company. The new company will have a four-member board of directors, with equal representation of Thales and DCN, and will be chaired by a DCN nominee.  The purpose of the Prime Contract Office is to lead the PA2 programme from conception to completion. It would also be able to assist the studies for potential cooperation with the United Kingdom’s future aircraft carrier programme, should this be desired by both governments. The shareholding of the new joint company will be DCN 65% and Thales 35%."

The agreement was actually signed on 18 May.  The joint prime contract office was called Maìtrise d'Oeuvre Porte Avions No 2 (MOPA2).  DCN was expected to play the lead role in the PA2 platform design and construction, while Thales would have the lead role as regards electronic systems (power, communications, networking, combat, radar, surveillance, etc.), and will also be a vital link in discussions with UK concerning co-operation.  In order to reduce costs, Chantiers de l'Altantique was expected to be key player in building the hull of PA2.  The French Ministry of Defense and DGA seemed to have accepted this development (indeed they actively encouraged it) which has finally killed off any hope of a unified joint Anglo-French aircraft carrier project, with the two countries building basically the same design.  As a side effect (or deliberately), it also prevents any significant UK involvement in the French project, something long predicted by sceptical BAE Systems executives.  The Chairman and CEO of Thales, Denis Ranque, later told the Defense Commission of the French National Assembly that he expected at most only 20% industrial co-operation.

It was probably no coincidence that a few days later, on 9 June, the French Ministry of Defence issued a press release stating that the French and British Ministers for Defence had met that day on board the French carrier  Charles de Gaulle, anchored off Gosport, and had approved a document defining the future stages of co-operation in the field of aircraft carriers. The scope covered industrial and technological aspects, as well as operational co-operation.  A joint statement said "Industrial talks are currently identifying cost and time savings and reduction of risk for both programmers.   We expect an initial view including, where appropriate, a quantitative assessment on risk reduction and financial benefits from industry by the end of September 2004.   There are promising paths of co-operations on systems, subsystems and equipment dealing with ... power generation and distribution, propulsion, ships control, data distribution and surveillance systems."  An accompanying press release from the French Ministry of Defense also stated that construction work would begin on the second French porte-avions in 2005 [meaning definition and design studies rather than construction work] and that the new ship would be in service before 2015, a service life of 40 years was implied. 

Major improvements planned compared with Charles de Gaulle included increased tonnage, greater margins for meeting future requirements (e.g. UAV's), an ability to operate heavier aircraft (due to the longer catapults), a larger hanger, a bigger and higher flight deck, improved ammunition stores and and preparation areas, adaptable aviation fuel tanks, and aviation workshops and stores adequate to the support a similar size air group for longer.  Many of these improvements were lessons learnt from the deployment of Charles de Gaulle in Operation Heracles in 2001-2.  The available funding did not permit the construction of a nuclear carrier of tonnage sufficient to meet these requirements.  After an analysis of the operational, financial and industrial aspects, conventional propulsion was selected on the basis that this would result in a 10% reduction in total cost of ownership compared with nuclear.

In September 2004 DCN and Thales published more details of their joint design for PA2 - now termed Projet Juliette.  Although the tonnage (59,000 tonnes) and dimensions (284m overall) were similar to the UK's CVF, the overall appearance of the one island design was much closer to Charles de Gaulle.  Work on Projet Juliette was continued until summer 2005, by which time it was clear that it was unrealisable with in the Defense Ministry Euro 2.7 billion budget ceiling for PA2.